



20 MARCH 1992



FOREIGN  
BROADCAST  
INFORMATION  
SERVICE

# ***JPRS Report***

## **Proliferation Issues**



19980112 040

REPRODUCED BY  
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE  
NATIONAL TECHNICAL  
INFORMATION SERVICE  
SPRINGFIELD, VA 22161

DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 6

# PROLIFERATION ISSUES

JPRS-TND-92-007

## CONTENTS

20 March 1992

[This report contains foreign media information on issues related to worldwide proliferation and transfer activities in nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, including delivery systems and the transfer of weapons-relevant technologies.]

### CHINA

Qian, Hurd View Nuclear Proliferation <i>[XINHUA]</i> .....	1
Launch Spokesman Details Carrier Rocket Status <i>[XINHUA]</i> .....	1
Nuclear Corporation To Popularize 27 Projects <i>[XINHUA]</i> .....	1
Achievements of Satellite Monitoring Network <i>[XINHUA]</i> .....	1

### EAST ASIA

#### SOUTH KOREA

Seoul To Buy Nuclear Fuel Through Open Bids <i>[THE KOREA ECONOMIC WEEKLY 9 Mar]</i> ..	3
---	---

### EAST EUROPE

#### CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Calfa Interviewed on Arms Trade, Policy <i>[MLADA FRONTA DNES 5 Mar]</i> .....	4
--	---

#### YUGOSLAVIA

Deputies Demand End to Illegal Arms Imports <i>[TANJUG]</i> .....	7
---	---

### LATIN AMERICA

#### REGIONAL AFFAIRS

Argentina, Brazil Propose Changes to Tlatelolco <i>[Sao Paulo GAZETA MERCANTIL 15-17 Feb]</i> ..	8
--	---

#### ARGENTINA

'Substantial Change' in Nuclear Policy Discussed <i>[CLARIN 6 Mar]</i> .....	9
--	---

#### BRAZIL

CIS Scientists To Be Hired for Space Program <i>[O GLOBO 10 Mar]</i> .....	9
--	---

### NEAR EAST & SOUTH ASIA

#### EGYPT

Musa Urges Israel To Sign Nonproliferation Pact <i>[MENA]</i> .....	10
---	----

#### INDIA

Delhi Negative on Nuclear Treaty, Conference <i>[Delhi Radio]</i> .....	10
---	----

## IRAN

U.S. Intent To Seize North Korean Ship Assailed .....	10
Options Assessed <i>[Tehran Radio]</i> .....	10
Planning 'Act of Maritime Piracy' <i>[AFP]</i> .....	11
Dailies Lambaste U.S. 'Pressure' <i>[IRNA]</i> .....	11
Papers Assess U.S. Stand on Korean Freighter <i>[IRNA]</i> .....	12

## ISRAEL

Shipment of Scud Missiles to Syria Criticized .....	12
Levi Takes 'Serious View' <i>[Jerusalem Radio]</i> .....	12
Meets With U.S. Official <i>[Jerusalem Radio]</i> .....	12
Arens To Broach Issue With Cheney <i>[YEDI'OT AHARONOT 12 Mar]</i> .....	13
Ben-Elisar on U.S. 'Impotence' <i>[HA'ARETZ 12 March]</i> .....	13
'Disgraceful U.S. Failure' Seen <i>[YEDI'OT AHARONOT 12 Mar]</i> .....	13
'Additional' Vessel En Route to Iran <i>[Jerusalem TV]</i> .....	13

## PAKISTAN

Spokesman on Indian Nonproliferation Stand <i>[Islamabad TV]</i> .....	13
Spokesman on 'Full Safeguards' at Nuclear Plant <i>[Islamabad Radio]</i> .....	14

## CENTRAL EURASIA

Foreign Ministry's Churkin Holds News Conference .....	15
Views Arms Sales <i>[INTERFAX]</i> .....	15
Cuba, Taiwan Potential Buyers <i>[TASS]</i> .....	15
Russia's Uranium Sales to U.S. Viewed <i>[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA 5 Mar]</i> .....	15
Nuclear Talks on Korean Peninsula Discussed <i>[Moscow International]</i> .....	17
DPRK Envoy on 'Secret' Nuclear Depot in ROK <i>[Moscow International]</i> .....	17
Russia, Cuba Discuss Finishing Nuclear Plant <i>[INTERFAX]</i> .....	18
French Official Urges Nonproliferation Treaty <i>[INTERFAX]</i> .....	18
Brazil Interested in Employing Space Experts <i>[Radio Rossii]</i> .....	19
Uranium Exports Planned; Libyan Group Visits <i>[MOSCOW NEWS 19-26 Jan]</i> .....	19
Uranium Smugglers Caught in Germany 'Amateurs' <i>[IZVESTIYA 11 Mar]</i> .....	19
Japanese Rumors of Nuclear Brain Drain Viewed <i>[IZVESTIYA 6 Mar]</i> .....	20
Physicist Examines Reasons for Brain Drain <i>[Moscow TV]</i> .....	20
Russian Nuclear Physicists on Recruitment <i>[TASS]</i> .....	22
Kravchuk Suspends Removal of Nuclear Weapons <i>[TASS]</i> .....	22
Russia Rules Out Nuclear Arms Use in Caucasus .....	23
Vice President Rutskoy Comments <i>[Russian TV]</i> .....	23
General: No Nuclear Arms in Caucasus <i>[INTERFAX]</i> .....	23
Businessmen Attempt To Sell Nuclear Materials <i>[TASS]</i> .....	23
Nuclear Material Reportedly Offered for Sale <i>[Hamburg DER SPIEGEL 9 Mar]</i> .....	23
Institute Pioneers Nuclear Monitoring Equipment <i>[Russian TV]</i> .....	25

## WEST EUROPE

### FRANCE

Institute Develops Atom-Level Microprobe <i>[SCIENCES &amp; AVENIR Jan]</i> .....	26
---	----

### GERMANY

Isotope Technique Used for Uranium Enrichment <i>[Paris LE MONDE 21 Jan]</i> .....	26
Cabinet Adopts Report on Tighter Export Controls <i>[ADN]</i> .....	27
Resettlers Arrested for Trying To Sell Uranium <i>[SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG 10 Mar]</i> .....	27

### TURKEY

'Close Watch' Maintained on CIS Missiles <i>[HURRIYET 4 Mar]</i> .....	28
--	----

**Qian, Hurd View Nuclear Proliferation**

*OW0903203492 Beijing XINHUA in English  
2015 GMT 9 Mar 92*

[Excerpt] London, March 9 (XINHUA)—China today handed over its instrument of accession to the Non-Proliferation Treaty to Britain.

The document was presented by visiting Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen during a meeting with British Prime Minister John Major at 10 Downing Street.

While presenting the document, Qian said, "China has all along stood for a complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons."

"China does not advocate, encourage or engage in the proliferation of nuclear weapons, nor does it help other countries to develop nuclear weapons," said the Chinese foreign minister, who arrived in Britain on Saturday for an official visit.

China wants a complete and thorough destruction of all nuclear weapons in the world, Qian said.

Qian said, "the prevention of nuclear proliferation is not an end in itself, but a measure and step in the process towards complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons."

After joining the treaty, China "will continue to make contributions" to the realization of the three objectives formulated by the treaty, namely, prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, acceleration of nuclear disarmament and use of nuclear energy, which China regarded as "interrelated and inseparable."

Major welcomed China's entry to the treaty and said it is an event of great significance. It is of great importance to China, to the U.K. and to the United Nations, he said. [passage omitted]

**Launch Spokesman Details Carrier Rocket Status**

*OW0803020692 Beijing XINHUA Domestic Service  
in Chinese 1121 GMT 7 Mar 92*

[Text] Xichang, 7 March (XINHUA)—A spokesman of the China Satellite Launch Monitoring and Control System Department stationed at the Xichang site for launching a satellite for Australia announced here today: After undergoing tests at the technical area for more than a month, the Long March 2-E strapped carrier rocket with powerful thrust to be used in launching the "Aosai-te [3421 6457 3676]-B1" communications satellite for Australia was delivered to the launch area today, and the work of hoisting the carrier rocket and making it stand erect on the launch pad was smoothly completed.

This new model of carrier rocket with powerful thrust made by China was delivered to the Xichang Satellite Launch Center on 17 January. Chinese personnel conducted technical tests with the satellite in a horizontal state at the rocket test building in the technical area. These tests were completed on 16 February. Joint rocket and satellite operations were completed again under close cooperation between Chinese and U.S. technical personnel at the satellite building on 1 March. The present situation shows preparations for launching the satellite for Australia are making smooth progress. In the next step, China will begin to conduct technical tests with the carrier rocket in a vertical state.

**Nuclear Corporation To Popularize 27 Projects**

*OW1003085392 Beijing XINHUA in English  
0703 GMT 10 Mar 92*

[Text] Beijing, March 10 (XINHUA)—The China National Nuclear Corporation has decided to popularize 27 major items of scientific achievements in the nuclear industry.

As one of the steps to speed up transforming scientific achievements into the productive forces, the corporation will establish an office special [as received] to popularize scientific and technological achievements and work out preferential policies to encourage application of the achievements.

According to a spokesman for the corporation, it won national and ministerial-level prizes for 2,500 scientific and technological achievements during the Seventh Five-Year Plan (1986-1990).

The spokesman said that about 220 such achievements have been put into use in industry with a total investment of 120 million yuan, and have generated a total output of 840 million yuan.

Listed in the corporation's Eighth Five-Year Plan for promoting scientific and technological achievements (1991-1995), the 27 major items include a radiation flaw detector, nuclear medical devices and equipment, an air plasma cutter and computer-controlled embroidering machine.

**Achievements of Satellite Monitoring Network**

*OW0703103992 Beijing XINHUA in English  
0917 GMT 7 Mar 92*

[Text] Beijing, March 7 (XINHUA)—China has made significant progress in satellite monitoring, measurement, remote-control, information exchange, and data processing, a Chinese space official said here today.

China's satellite measurement and control network, which covers a major part of the country, consists of the Xi'an satellite measurement and control centre, an

ocean-going space measurement fleet, stationary and mobile monitoring stations, a communications system, and research institutes of measurement and control technology, he said.

"The network is able to keep a close measurement and control of many types of satellites including sun-synchronous satellites, geostationary satellites, and near-earth orbit satellites," he noted.

China's satellite monitoring network has been able to trace the launch of recoverable satellites and the launch of several satellites by one rocket, he said.

The network also takes care of the long-term management of six communications satellites and two meteorological satellites, according to the official.

Recently, China's satellite monitoring network, in coordination with satellite research institutes, has successfully moved a communications satellite, which had been hurled into a wrong orbit last December, to a stable big oval orbit.

The network has successfully traced the movement of "Skylab," "Cosmos 1402" and nuclear-powered maritime reconnaissance satellites as well as provide collected data to international organizations.

## SOUTH KOREA

### Seoul To Buy Nuclear Fuel Through Open Bids

SK0903054692 Seoul *THE KOREA ECONOMIC WEEKLY* in English 9 Mar 92 p 1

[Text] The government reportedly plans to buy nuclear fuel through international open tenders, rather than negotiated contracts with advanced nations, beginning in 1994.

Previously, the nation tried to ensure a smooth supply by concluding negotiated contracts with advanced nations and nuclear fuel-producing countries, even if prices were higher than on the spot market, officials at the Energy-Resources Ministry said.

In view of the favorable market conditions stemming from oversupply, the government will try to buy nuclear fuels at the lowest prices through open tenders, they said.

Last year Korea bought \$81,650,000 worth of nuclear fuels from Australia, Canada and France at an average price of \$20 per pound (on an enriched uranium basis), about 2.5 times the \$8 per pound quoted on the international spot market.

Consequently, the ministry intends to buy all future fuel needed for new nuclear power units and for the termination of the existing purchase contracts only through international open tenders.

The spot price for enriched uranium began declining early last year to \$7.25 per lb in October, and rebounded slightly to \$8.50 per lb toward the end of the year, but began dropping again this year.

## CZECHOSLOVAKIA

**Calfa Interviewed on Arms Trade, Policy**  
*AU0903133492 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES  
 in Czech 5 Mar 92 p 7*

[Interview with Federal Prime Minister Marian Calfa by Andrej Surnak: place and date not given:] "The Lobby Is Taking its Loss of Status Badly."

[Text] [Surnak] Slovak Deputy Prime Minister Martin Porubjak, a fellow member of the Civic Democratic Union-Public Against Violence Party, made a statement in which he inferred that certain Arab countries interested in our weapons would like the CSFR to break up so that arms production would be continued in Slovakia. Do you agree with this statement?

[Calfa] I do not know if Mr. Porubjak has any evidence to back this claim. It seems a little farfetched to me. I would stick to the Central European region and its problems. I do not think there is any desire to maintain several plants in Czechoslovakia or for Slovakia to produce these few tanks. If you consider how widely the countries of the former Soviet Union are trading in arms or what immense capacity—as far as weapons systems and tanks are concerned—China and other countries have, then there are so many weapons on the market today that mankind is faced with an absolute glut of them.

[Surnak] Slovak politicians, mainly from the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia, favor a fundamental renewal of economic relations with Arab countries, whereas Czech and federal politicians are united in their support for the State of Israel. When considering the criteria for exporting arms to individual Middle Eastern countries, agreement among these politicians could be just wishful thinking. To what extent do disputes about our common foreign policy concept influence progress in settling the CSFR's constitutional and legal arrangement?

[Calfa] I think people in Czechoslovakia should be interested in renewing trade with Arab countries. Of course, we differentiate among them from a foreign policy point of view. We have adhered to all the embargoes declared by the United Nations. In other words, we would like to develop our economic relations with the countries in this region, but we respect the decisions made by the international community. Obviously, you mean instances where arms supplies could be a condition for developing economic relations. In this case, we would consider whether interest in arms supplies is paramount or whether interest in trade has priority. However, I do not know of any Arab country that would set such a condition. There was one country with which we held important negotiations on this subject and which linked the export of weapons systems—albeit older ones—with civilian trade. However, this was not an Arab state. As far as the constitutional and legal arrangement is concerned, the armaments industry played a certain role in the arguments put forward by some political forces to Czech and federal representatives. Of course, few people

know that the Czech Republic is also considerably affected by the conversion of arms production, particularly its electrotechnical industry. The arms industry in Slovakia affected by conversion accounts for roughly 6 percent of all industry. I do not think the remaining 94 percent will be destroyed by this 6 percent. This is a regional issue and the problem is that a certain lobby accustomed to a particular status is, evidently, taking its loss badly. This is more of a political matter than a constitutional and legal one.

[Surnak] Another Federal Assembly session began this week. Among other things, it should deal with a draft law that would regulate the arms trade. Since 1990 the necessity of its adoption has been conveyed in various government resolutions. Why, then, has the Federal Government de facto done nothing to ensure its timely discussion in the federal parliament?

[Calfa] It is not quite true that the Federal Government has done nothing. The government prepared this law and it was debated during the comments procedure where it met with rejection on the republican level. According to the republics, it attempts to regulate matters that fall within their jurisdiction. Of course, it is necessary to emphasize that it is untrue that the arms trade sphere would not be strictly regulated. The only thing not completely under supervision is the fact that any Czechoslovak organization can whenever it wants make a bid or survey the arms market without actually having the possibility of completing the contract without approval from a state body....

[Surnak] You mean the licensing procedure that was abrogated by the Commercial Code at the beginning of this year. However, it was already known last year that this would happen....

[Calfa] We thought that the licensing procedure would suffice and that the commercial unreliability of a number of companies would finally be made clear, because they would be unable to keep their promises to their customers if they did not obtain approval from a state body. Such companies can cast Czechoslovakia in a bad light, but we cannot state that a contract would be fulfilled. This should come under supervision. Unfortunately, when this issue is discussed the impression is always given that anyone can export arms anywhere from Czechoslovakia. This is not true.

[Surnak] Nevertheless, certain negative processes are involved here. For example, artificial price reductions when several firms offer the same goods. This is not in the economic interest of either the state or the producer. Moreover, people lacking the necessary moral and civic qualities deal in the arms trade....

[Calfa] If you are talking about prices, then, obviously, firms undercut each other on the market via their offers. However, they only make offers. When an export license is granted, the individual contract is scrutinized; this means looking into who is conducting the deal and with

whom, the country of final destination, how much the goods are being sold for, and also the payment conditions—that is, how serious they are. Firms can undercut each other, but in the end the state body approves the price in the license. Do you want to prohibit them beforehand from undercutting each other? Are they to agree among themselves?

[Surnak] No, but we have a limited range of producers and an optimum number of companies that would represent them commercially and would be under the state's supervision should correspond to them.

[Calfa] That would mean returning to the system we had previously, the one the Commercial Code abrogated. We must introduce a procedure that would enable companies to move around in this market in general. We are returning to state regulation and are tightening trading conditions in response to a liberal Commercial Code. I, personally, am in favor of this.

[Surnak] The authors of the deputies' version of the law propose that the prime minister should head the government committee responsible for making the final decision in contentious cases....

[Calfa] I will reject this proposal, because the prime minister is the head of government. I do not need to head another body. Either the government will make the decisions on these issues—these would then be collective decisions—or the task will fall to the appropriate department. In a democratic system no other body with the power of arbitration can stand between a department and the government. We have the State Defense Council alongside the government. Of course, we required a constitutional law for this because we established another body parallel to the government. However, in my opinion, it is not good to establish bodies parallel to the government. Such a body can only have a coordinating or consultative role, it can give specialist consideration to the whole matter, but it must then make a recommendation and the government will make the final decision.

[Surnak] In this connection, advanced states are familiar with these variants—the American presidential system or the European system where either the government has this jurisdiction or a government committee chaired by the prime minister has it. This ensures the necessary constitutional and political responsibility for such a decision.

[Calfa] I do not know what kind of systems there are in the world, but the presidential system is obvious. There is no prime minister in the United States and the president has immense constitutional jurisdiction. In our country the government should make decisions on such matters. The general question is whether the bodies responsible for the republics' economies, that is, the republican governments, should make the decisions on exporting this merchandise.

[Surnak] Of course, the CSFR has certain obligations to the European Community resulting from the Association Agreement.

[Calfa] However, it is also stated in the accompanying letter that the republics will participate in fulfilling these obligations in harmony with their jurisdiction.

[Surnak] [Federal Deputy Prime Minister] Pavel Rychetsky and Jiri Dienstbier criticize the Federal Foreign Trade Ministry because the Foreign Ministry does not have the right of veto in the interdepartmental commission that authorizes arms exports. The interdepartmental commission's authority was, of course, stipulated by government Decree No. 174/1991 and, as far as I am aware, the aforementioned government members agreed with it. Are you aware of any commercial transaction that the Foreign Ministry disagreed with, but, despite this, was implemented?

[Calfa] No. The Federal Foreign Ministry has agreed to all the commercial transactions that have been implemented and for which the Federal Foreign Trade Ministry has granted licenses. I think that when an interdepartmental commission is established, it should involve departments that enjoy equal status. No one ministry should have the right of veto there. Another structure is possible. If someone disagrees with something in the commission, the foreign trade minister has the right to override this view by submitting the material to the government for its decision. Therefore, I do not see why the Foreign Ministry should have the right of veto in the commission. The Defense Ministry would then also have to have the same right. I feel the Foreign Ministry is making a specific attempt to make the decisions.

[Surnak] Let us turn to more sensitive issues. Mr. Prime Minister, did you discuss the—for us—unfortunate case of the vessel Godewind with Mr. Kohl?

[Calfa] No. This is not a government matter. The bodies responsible for maintaining the law, that is, the courts and prosecutors' offices, are dealing with it. We will respect their decision, just as Mr. Kohl will have to respect it.

[Surnak] Will Czechoslovakia continue its tank exports to Syria?

[Calfa] Yes.

[Surnak] You mean the order that is now being implemented?

[Calfa] We concluded a contract with Syria. A license was issued for it and, therefore, it will be completed. It is pointless to discuss what will happen next. We have no intention to export more tanks.

[Surnak] It is rumored that there is strong pressure from certain Czech political circles to conclude a contract between Letecky Opravna [aircraft repair company] Malesice and a Syrian partner. Do you know anything about this?

[Calfa] Yes, I know about it. This involves repairing the engines of the L-39 aircraft we supplied to Syria. It is now necessary to consider whether repairing engines constitutes supplying technology. I think we can have no objections to servicing the aircraft we supplied. Moreover, Malesice is the only repair company in Czechoslovakia, including for the Czechoslovak Army. This order is extremely important for maintaining the enterprise's survival and we need this enterprise for the future.

[Surnak] At the moment, manufactured arms are at the center of attention. However, what is happening with those to which the Paris, Vienna, and Budapest agreements relate? A claim was made in the weekly RESPEKT that we exported 200 tanks to Peru.....

[Calfa] I do not know anything about the export of 200 tanks to Peru. A claim was made in RESPEKT a year ago that I know something about tank exports to North Korea. One can only laugh at such reports. We scrap the weapons we have undertaken to mothball from the Army. There are no doubts at all about this. The weapons systems our that Army does not require and are—naturally—mothballed are sold by the Army. The licensing procedure again comes into operation here.

[Surnak] What do you say to the Army being able to trade in arms itself?

[Calfa] The Army intends to set up a trade organization and I see no reason why it should not do so. This would be a trade organization like any other and it would have to be subject to the same supervision. It would be unable to operate on a purely market and profit basis. It would just be a selling organization and its income and expenditure would be directly associated with the Army's budget. Incidentally, it is apparent from the conclusions reached by parliament on this year's budget that the Army will have revenue outside the budget, that is, from arms sales. It is also necessary to add that we have the institution of Army Inspector General written into our constitution, that is, another supervisory mechanism above the Army.

[Surnak] Do you think anxiety about the Tamara defense radar system being duplicated if it is sold to the Middle East is warranted? After all, this system should be replaced by the much more modern BORAP [expansion unknown] system within the next five years.

[Calfa] It is ludicrous that Tamara is regarded as a weapon. RESPEKT did this, too. Tamara is a radar system that serves as a defense system. It is in fact a ground-based AWACS system. Tamara was deployed in the Army of the former GDR and has remained in the Bundeswehr. It is among the Syrian Army's equipment. Incidentally, when you sell such a system, you must expect that someone will try and find out how it works. We can only do one thing. If a system of this type crops up somewhere, we can apply for protection by legal means. However, we are interested in ensuring that Tesla Pardubice exports this product, one of the few state-of-the-art electronic products in Czechoslovakia.

[Surnak] Can it be said that the government also supports the development of the new system?

[Calfa] No one has asked the government for any resources to develop new systems. If Pardubice develops this system on its own as an electronics plant, it must know that it is saleable.

[Surnak] Is it true that on 6 December 1990 Omnipol exported anti-aircraft missiles and submachine guns to Slovenia?

[Calfa] I really do not know anything about this. When I asked the foreign trade minister about it, he was unable to confirm anything. Of course, I do not know what the system until 1990 was like....

[Surnak] It was the state plan procedure....

[Calfa] If an official order was made and it met with all the requirements, there would have been no legal obstacles in Czechoslovakia to the contract being fulfilled. Of course, right now, I cannot be exactly sure of this. However, I can say that if it is ever ascertained that our regulations were violated, we will draw the appropriate conclusions.

[Surnak] Mr. Prime Minister, will you support the amendment to Article 16 of the jurisdiction law and the deputies' draft law that, among other things, should regulate the arms trade?

[Calfa] As far as the jurisdiction law is concerned, I give it absolutely no chance of being adopted. So far, jurisdiction has been transferred from the federation to the republican level. The intention of the aforementioned draft is the opposite—to literally declare the federation's jurisdiction in this sphere.

[Surnak] Then, of course, the aforementioned draft law cannot even be submitted as it infringes on the Constitution.

[Calfa] I do not know if anyone is aware of this, but today's licensing system is not based on the law. It proceeds from the general realization of all the participants that it is necessary to issue licenses from one place and that this has a great bearing on foreign policy. So, they sort of respect this system despite the fact there is no legal basis for it. Of course, there is no reason to attack their conduct, on the contrary.

[Surnak] Can it then be said that this involves a discreet "gentlemen's" agreement among the three governments until the elections?

[Calfa] Why until the elections? Until the agreement is changed. Perhaps it will still be adhered to after the elections. To be honest, it would be better if this system was on a purely legal basis.

[Surnak] Thank you for the interview.

## YUGOSLAVIA

### Deputies Demand End to Illegal Arms Imports

*LD1203232492 Belgrade TANJUG in English  
1733 GMT 12 Mar 92*

[Text] Belgrade, March 12 (TANJUG)—Deputies of two Yugoslav parliamentary committees demanded today that competent federal bodies take the "strongest possible measures" to halt illegal arms imports for paramilitary formations. At a joint session of the Committee for Internal Policy and the Committee for National Defence of the bicameral parliament's Federal Chamber, it was said that in Yugoslavia, which was likened to a "powderkeg," so much weaponry had been imported without control in the past two years that it was practically impossible to establish the exact quantity.

The deputies stressed that illegal arms imports should be halted in the Republic of Bosnia-Hercegovina, Sandzak (a region in Serbia half of whose population are Muslims) and the Serbian province of Kosovo and Metohija, which has a majority ethnic Albanian population.

In these areas secessionists are trying to "stir up inter-ethnic conflicts and extend the war beyond the territory of Croatia," it was stressed. A report handed to the deputies said that the "process of illegal arming of party-paramilitary formations is almost complete in Bosnia-Hercegovina."

In Kosovo and Metohija, ethnic Albanian separatists have formed local police units which are arming themselves. In Sandzak and some areas in the Republic of Montenegro Moslem paramilitary units have been formed, the report added.

The Republic of Macedonia, which has sought international recognition, is also setting up Army formations. In Serbia, party paramilitary formations have been formed and a number of their volunteers have taken part in the war in Croatia. The uncontrolled arms imports started in late 1990 following Slovenia's and Croatia's bids for independence. At the time, the Yugoslav Presidency issued an order on the disarmament of all paramilitary formations but its implementation was blocked by the presidency members from Croatia and Slovenia. In the report of the federal bodies of the state administration it is recalled that the breakaway republics of Croatia and Slovenia "armed themselves in order to achieve their independence in a violent way." The subsequent U.N. embargo on arms imports was not only disregarded but the amount of arms deliveries actually increased.

Croatia and Slovenia receive most of their weapons and other military equipment from Austria, Hungary, Germany, Poland, Italy, Czechoslovakia, Panama and Argentina, according to the report. Yugoslav Army Major General Aleksandar Vasiljevic said that the Army had cut off a number of secret arms imports channels, especially those for heavy weapons. Vasiljevic cited examples of deliveries from Hungary, Italy and a number of countries in Europe and the Middle East.

## REGIONAL AFFAIRS

**Argentina, Brazil Propose Changes to Tlatelolco**  
92WP0163A Sao Paulo GAZETA MERCANTIL  
in Portuguese 15-17 Feb 92 p 11

[Article by Maria Helena Tachinardi]

**[Text]** Brasilia—Presidents Fernando Collor and Carlos Menem on Friday sent a letter to Mexican President Carlos Salinas de Gortari informing him concerning the negotiations that they plan to initiate with the Latin American countries for the purpose of putting into effect the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which bans nuclear weapons on the continent.

Mexico is the headquarters of the Organization To Ban Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (OPANAL), which functions as the secretariat of Tlatelolco. In the message to Salinas—sent on the very date the treaty celebrated the 25th anniversary of its existence—the presidents of Brazil and Argentina also congratulated the Government of France for having ratified Protocol No.1 of the treaty. By doing so, the French Government pledged not to carry out nuclear explosions in the region.

The communication to Salinas explains that the two countries are “taking effective measures to implement the third and last commitment in the Declaration of Foz do Iguacu.” Brazil and Argentina will propose to OPANAL certain amendments to Articles 14, 15, and 16 of the treaty: “amendments,” they say, “that are of a preeminently technical nature and will in no way affect the principles and objectives of the treaty.”

The three amendments relate to inspections that are regarded as excessive and unnecessary. Chile will assist Brazil and Argentina in their negotiations with the other countries to obtain changes in the aforementioned articles.

With this action, Tlatelolco could take effect shortly in all the countries of Latin America. Cuba—which has not signed the treaty—is no longer a problem, Foreign Minister Rezek said on Friday. “Whether Cuba does or does not ratify Tlatelolco has become an academic question,” he said. “It makes little difference in the present circumstances, because from a practical standpoint the Cuban Government will not be in a position to develop nuclear weapons.”

The Brazilian foreign minister said that Brazil and other countries such as Chile will be able to forego the restrictive clause that they have invoked in order to exempt themselves from putting the treaty into effect in their respective territories. Brazil and Chile have signed and ratified Tlatelolco but do not consider it to be in effect, on the grounds that several conditions remain to be fulfilled before the treaty can be fully operative.

In their letter to Salinas, Menem and Collor recall that the entry into effect of Tlatelolco is the third and last

commitment in the Declaration of Foz do Iguacu concerning the exclusively peaceful use of nuclear energy. The other commitments were: the creation of the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for the Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC), and the conclusion of the accord between the ABACC, Brazil, Argentina, and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) concerning comprehensive safeguards.

**Message to Salinas From Collor and Menem**

The presidents of Brazil and Argentina last Friday—the 25th anniversary of the Treaty of Tlatelolco—sent a message to President Carlos Salinas de Gortari. Following is the complete text of the message:

Your Excellency, Mr. Carlos Salinas de Gortari, constitutional president of the United States of Mexico:

Dear Mr. President and Dear Friend:

I have the honor of addressing Your Excellency on the occasion of the celebration of the 25th anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

In this connection, the president of Argentina and I are transmitting to the OPANAL conference—which has been convened to celebrate the occasion—a Joint Declaration, the text of which is as follows:

1. Since we took office as presidents of our respective countries, we have given a new and decisive impetus to a common nuclear policy on matters that include non-proliferation. We have always been motivated by the intention to make our nuclear programs transparently clear internally and externally, and to demonstrate to the international community the exclusively peaceful objectives that orient these programs in accordance with the spirit of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, whose 25th anniversary we are commemorating today.
2. This program reflects the determination and political will of our governments to strengthen regional and international peace and security, by means that include the adoption of clear-cut mechanisms for verification.
3. In this context, we decided—in the Declaration on a Common Nuclear Policy made at Foz do Iguacu on 28 November 1990—on three concrete steps:
  - a. The creation of a Common System for the Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials.
  - b. The conclusion—with the International Atomic Energy Agency—of a joint accord on safeguards.
  - c. The adoption of initiatives that will enable the Treaty of Tlatelolco to take effect in the two countries, including negotiations with a view to updating and perfecting the text of the treaty.
4. The international community is witness to the speed and efficiency with which these initiatives have achieved the results that are well known to everyone, namely:

- a. The Brazil-Argentina Accord for the Exclusively Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy—signed on 18 July 1991 in the city of Guadalajara and already ratified by the Congresses of both countries—which represents the concretization of the first step.
- b. The signature, on 13 December 1991, of the accord between Argentina, Brazil, the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for the Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials, and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the implementation of safeguards.
5. We are today taking practical measures for the implementation of the third and last commitment in the Declaration of Foz do Iguacu. As soon as possible we shall submit—for consideration by OPANAL—a number of amendments to the text of the Treaty of Tlatelolco that are preeminently of a technical nature and in no way affect the principles and objectives of the treaty.
6. We ask all the countries of our region to give their indispensable support to this initiative, which is intended to facilitate implementation of the treaty.
7. We congratulate the Government of France for its decision to ratify Protocol No. 1 of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. This will assist in establishing—in what we hope will be the near future—the legal validity of the treaty throughout the entire region for which it is intended.
8. All of these recent developments manifest the profound and shared desire to consolidate Latin America and the Caribbean as a nuclear weapons-free zone and lead us to a common conviction that finalization of the process—which has now been announced—for approval of the amendments to the text of the treaty will decisively open the way for implementation of the treaty in our respective countries.
9. In this way, Brazil and Argentina are making a distinct and positive contribution to the establishment of a new international climate characterized by cooperation and by the creation of confidence among the nations—factors that are central to the preservation of international peace and security.

In this way, Mr. President, we are initiating the anticipated process that will enable the Treaty of Tlatelolco to take full effect in Argentina and Brazil.

In order that Mexico may be fully informed, in advance, of our objectives, we shall submit the amendments for consideration by the Mexican Government within the very near future. We trust that we shall have Mexico's indispensable support in this effort, the results of which will be of great importance for the region and for the rest of the international community.

I wish to take this opportunity, Mr. President, to extend to Your Excellency this assurance of my highest esteem.

My very best regards

[signed] Fernando Collor de Mello

## ARGENTINA

### 'Substantial Change' in Nuclear Policy Discussed

PY0803030892 Buenos Aires CLARIN in Spanish  
6 Mar 92 p 7

[Excerpt] Although the issue was not on the agenda, the cabinet yesterday analyzed alternatives for a substantial change in the cabinet's nuclear policy to announce to the international community and, among other proposals, formalizing a declaration on the use of atomic energy with peaceful goals.

Foreign Minister Guido Di Tella brought up the issue after he talked about sending troops to former Yugoslavia to join the UN peacekeeping forces. According to some participants, Di Tella was very categorical about the need to end any suspicion about Argentine nuclear development. He even took a step further, saying that it did not make any sense to continue current research paths. Di Tella's goal involves ratification of the Tlatelolco Treaty on nuclear nonproliferation. Therefore, he said, it is not desirable to hold back gestures in this regard. [passage omitted]

## BRAZIL

### CIS Scientists To Be Hired for Space Program

PY1103025892 Rio de Janeiro O GLOBO in Portuguese  
10 Mar 92 p 5

[Text] Sao Jose dos Campos—The Aeronautical Technology Institute (ITA) is going to take advantage of the experience and knowledge of the scientists of the CIS—the former USSR—to improve the Brazilian space program. The ITA is selecting 20 scientists for this purpose from Russian universities and research centers. The selected scientists will receive up to \$2,000 per month from the Education Ministry's scholarship funds.

This announcement was made yesterday by Education Minister Jose Goldemberg after the inaugural class for the 86 new ITA students. The scientists will start by lecturing and, later on, will carry out research related to the space program.

Goldemberg said: "The Russians are experts in aerodynamics, propulsion, and other areas, and may share important experiences with our scientists."

ITA is making its contacts with CIS scientists through the Russian Embassy. So far, the ITA has the resumes of 15 CIS scientists and another 10 from scientists in England, Germany, France, the United States, and other countries. They were selected from the data bank of the National Council for Scientific and Technological Development (CNPq), which has a list of professors and scientists willing to work in Brazil. An ITA team will travel in the next few months to meet and interview the prospective candidates.

## EGYPT

**Musa Urges Israel To Sign Nonproliferation Pact**

*NC1103124392 Cairo MENA in Arabic 1018 GMT  
11 Mar 92*

[Text] Cairo, 11 Mar (MENA)—Foreign Minister 'Amr Musa today welcomed procedures in China to sign the nonproliferation treaty and described this step as a very important contribution to world efforts to curb the hazards of nuclear weapons. He said that the Chinese measure will enhance the effectiveness of the treaty as a basis for a universal system to prevent nuclear proliferation and to eventually achieve full nuclear disarmament.

Musa called for intensified regional and international efforts to give form to that universal system by expanding the membership of the treaty to cover states that have their own nuclear programs, and particularly because we are coming closer to the 1995 conference of the treaty's signatories to discuss renewing the treaty.

The foreign minister affirmed that Egypt will resume its efforts to protect the Middle East against nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction through arrangements that equate the regional states in terms of rights and liabilities. These arrangements will cover all weapons of mass destruction without exception and will involve an efficient control system.

Musa appealed to Israel to adopt speedy measures to sign the nonproliferation treaty and to follow the example of its Arab neighbors as an initial step toward establishing a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East.

## INDIA

**Delhi Negative on Nuclear Treaty, Conference**

*BK1003074692 Delhi All India Radio Network  
in English 0730 GMT 10 Mar 92*

[Text] India has told the United States that it is willing for continued bilateral talks on nonproliferation. But it will not sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, nor attend any five-nation conference. This was conveyed by the foreign secretary, Mr. J.N. Dixit, during his talks with the U.S. State Department officials yesterday. He said the idea of further bilateral talks will be to see how India and the United States can advance the cause of nonproliferation.

Talking to Indian correspondents in Washington, Mr. Dixit said the U.S. officials accepted his proposal that they should make some suggestions for India's consideration. On the five-nation conference, he asserted that India will not participate in it.

## IRAN

**U.S. Intent To Seize North Korean Ship Assailed****Options Assessed**

*LD0903123692 Tehran Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran First Program Network in Persian 1059 GMT  
9 Mar 92*

[Station commentary]

[Text] Reports concerning the North Korean ship—which the CIA claims is carrying advanced Scud missiles bound for the Middle East—and reactions to those reports have become the most sensationalized story of Western news agencies and political circles.

U.S. President George Bush announced yesterday that all options for the inspection or seizure of that ship are being assessed. In some of their reports, Western news agencies have spoken of Iran as the ship's destination; others speak of Syria.

The first question that comes to mind is this: Can America legally inspect or seize the North Korean military vessel in international waters? All legal international agreements clearly state that the sovereignty of flag-bearing nations extends to their military vessels. The seizure or inspection of those vessels is considered an open infringement on their sovereignty. Despite this legal block, America's efforts to inspect this ship have attracted everyone's attention. An assessment of the aims of this act is of special importance to political circles.

Some political observers believe that Washington's aim can be assessed on two levels. First, that America is following particular motives along with international arms dealers. As a result of this sort of disruption it seeks to monopolize the arms trade on the world scale for the West and its partners. An assessment of the sensational propaganda launched by Western circles concerning the arms-bearing North Korean vessel is possible within this framework.

Legally speaking, the sale of arms from one country to another based on recognized international agreements for defense purposes is one of the known international rights of nations. This has no similarity whatsoever to the situation of Iraq, where the United Nations has imposed a blockade.

The second assessment that can clarify America's objective concerns the purchasers of arms on the international scale. American officials have said that Washington cannot be an observer to the sale of advanced Scud missiles to Syria which is in a state of hostility with Israel. This has led some political observers to believe that, in its new world order, the White House is bent on controlling the sale of arms on the world scale to those countries that are not in America's camp.

The justification of these policies has been underlined under the guise of maintaining world peace by White House officials during the past few days. This is incompatible with all logical assessments. Washington's sensitivity to the purchase of 20 long-range missiles by Syria, turning a blind eye to Israeli arms purchase, the 20-billion dollars per annum of military aid to Israel, and the production of various nuclear, biological and chemical weapons—including the various missiles by that aggressive regime—show that America seeks to provide security for Israel. Guarding world peace is nothing but a show. Washington seeks to achieve its objectives under its shadow.

On the whole, one can say that this American policy clarifies the nature of that regime for the Muslim people of the region more than ever before. It demonstrates this glaring fact: The world of blasphemy acts in a singly hostile manner toward the world of Islam. Muslims have no option other than unity in order to safeguard their existence.

**Planning 'Act of Maritime Piracy'**  
NC0903112392 Paris AFP in English 1052 GMT  
9 Mar 92

[Excerpts] Tehran, March 9 (AFP)—Iranian newspapers on Monday stepped up their criticism of U.S. threats to board North Korean freighters that may be carrying advanced Scud missiles to Iran or Syria.

"Such an undertaking on the part of the United States would be a clear breach of international maritime regulations," warned the English-language TEHRAN TIMES, which usually reflects government thinking.

"If the two freighters were carrying Scud missiles for Iran and Syria, they would not in any way be breaking any international rules and regulations," it said.

"Iran has every right to be armed and prepared for the defense of its territorial integrity in a region which was armed by the United States with the most advanced and destructive arms." [passage omitted]

For the Iranian paper ABRAR, close to Islamic militants here, "the whole affair is part of a campaign to control the North Korean arms program and to accuse Iran of trying to acquire nuclear weapons. It is also to pressure Syria in peace negotiations."

"If this affair mushrooms, the first victims will be the Arab states that threw themselves into the arms of the United States without thinking."

Another militant journal, JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI, charged that the United States was preparing "an act of maritime piracy."

"It is inadmissible and could have regrettable consequences if the international community does not stand up against this heavy handed measure by Washington."

#### Dailies Lambaste U.S. 'Pressure'

LD0903102692 Tehran IRNA in English 0927 GMT  
9 Mar 92

[Text] Tehran, March 9, IRNA—Three major morning dailies in their editorials Monday criticized the U.S. plan to intercept a Middle East-bound North Korean ship describing it "an outright act of international piracy." The dailies were referring to Washington's intention to intercept the North Korean freighter now heading for the Middle East.

The Persian daily "JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI" lashed out at the U.S. Administration's mentality that it can poke its nose in affairs of others. It appealed to international community to adopt a clear stand towards Washington's "impudence". Failure of the world community to withstand Washington's bullying, will surely embolden the White House to go on with its impudent measures.

The American move is detrimental to international peace and security and will ensue crisis and chaos in international relations. The world today is in need of order and law... Respect for the rights of nations and governments and equal rights for governments must be considered indispensable principles of the new world order, concluded JOMHURI.

The other Persian daily "ABRAR" wrote that Washington by staging the ballyhoo is pursuing two objectives, one at international level and the other at the regional level. This whole issue is part of the U.S. pressure on North Korea, Iran and Syria. At the same time the American President is taking advantage of the issue in his re-election campaign.

If White House goes ahead with its threat of inspecting the ship, it will push the Middle East region into a period of instability. Furthermore, the move will provide the U.S. with a pretext to openly increase its hold over the natural resources of the southern Persian Gulf region and will corner its future rivals in the new world order. Escalation of the ballyhoo over the ship will first of all pose threats on the Arab states which with no hesitation have been turned into U.S. client states.

Meanwhile, the English daily "TEHRAN TIMES" said that the two ships by navigating towards Iran and Syria have violated no international law and regulation. It is ironical that there was no objection from any international organization during the 1980-88 Iraq-Iran war when at least 70 Scud missiles, similar to those the North Korean ship is said to have been carrying, were fired on Iran.

"And the claim that the U.S. is objecting to North Korea for having dispatched such missiles to the Middle East wouldn't carry much weight in view of the fact that Washington made no objections when the Chinese furnished Saudi Arabia with much more advanced ballistic missiles."

In light of the steady fall in George Bush's popularity, he might be tempted to attract public opinion by engaging in an international adventure, concluded the English daily.

**Papers Assess U.S. Stand on Korean Freighter**  
**LD1203114692 Tehran IRNA in English 0842 GMT**  
**12 Mar 92**

[Text] Tehran, March 12, IRNA—Two morning dailies Thursday commented on the mysterious case of the Korean "Dae Hung Ho" freighter and the U.S. psychological war over the issue in the past two weeks.

"It is no secret that North Korea sells weapons to Iran and Syria. Nor is it a secret that the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, with America and Russia topping the list, all do a brisk annual business in arms. By comparison the Koreans are hardly a blip on the screen," wrote "KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL".

The daily quoted Pentagon spokesman Pete Williams as saying that the freighter slipped the highly vaunted U.S. military surveillance not because of the heavy maritime traffic in the region.

"I can't tell you why. I can't say precisely why we didn't see it all the time," the daily quoted him as saying.

However, the ship had not broken any international rules and on the contrary an American attempt to board it would have been a breach of maritime law.

"Attempting to board the Dae Hung Ho would have been risky and an illegal business. Clearly a few dead American sailors would smell bad for the White House in the run-up to elections," it concluded.

Commenting on the same subject, "SALAM" described the latest American ballyhoo as psychological warfare against the Islamic Republic of Iran.

As long as Iran was the country where the oppressed nations could invest their hopes and as long as Iran remained the upholder of the anti-imperialist campaign, the U.S. will remain hostile.

After Iran adopted an impartial stand towards the Persian Gulf crisis and following the release of all American hostages in Beirut, attempts were made to present a different profile of Iran to the Western public opinion.

SALAM quoted the late leader of the Islamic revolution Imam Khomeyni as saying that all the officials of the Islamic Republic as well as Iranians should know that neither the West nor the East would remain silent as long as Iran maintained its Islamic identity.

## ISRAEL

### Shipment of Scud Missiles to Syria Criticized

#### Levi Takes 'Serious View'

*TA1203093392 Jerusalem Qol Yisra'el in Hebrew*  
*0900 GMT 12 Mar 92*

[Text] Foreign Minister David Levi has said that Israel takes a serious view of the Scud shipment from North Korea to Syria. Our correspondent Jack Katzenell reports that Levi told U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Richard Bolton that Israel cannot stomach the fact that Syria is participating in the peace process and, at the same time, going out of its way to acquire long-range missiles, develop chemical weapons, and encourage terror from Lebanon.

#### Meets With U.S. Official

*TA1203120692 Jerusalem Qol Yisra'el in English*  
*1100 GMT 12 Mar 92*

[Excerpt] Foreign Minister David Levi said today that Syria cannot encourage terrorism and pursue a massive arms buildup while engaged in peace negotiations. He told visiting U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Richard Bolton there would have been no need to play cat-and-mouse with the North Korean ships if the West had taken a tough line with Syria from the outset. Jack Katzenell reports:

Foreign Minister Levi voiced deep concern over Syria's arms buildup and its production of chemical weapons and the affair of the ships bringing the North Korean Scud missiles. Syria threatens to go to war if there is any delay in the peace process, Levi says; she encourages the Palestinians and Jordanians to take a more extremist line; she allows the Iranian Revolutionary Guards to train the Hizballah in Lebanon; yet the international community gives her aid and does not demand that she change her policy.

Levi was referring to a recent decision by the Paris club to grant aid to Syria and to the \$2 billion given to Syria in return for her symbolic participation in the Gulf war coalition.

Richard Bolton promised to convey Levi's comments to Secretary of State Baker. Bolton is responsible for America's activities in international organizations, such as the United Nations, and his meeting with Levi was attended by Israel's UN Ambassador Yoram Aridor. I asked Aridor about the United Nations' current discussions with Tariq 'Aziz, the Iraqi foreign minister. Aridor feels cautious optimism about the prospects of disarming Saddam Husayn of his nuclear weapons. [passage omitted]

[Tel Aviv IDF Radio in Hebrew at 1100 GMT on 12 March carries a related report. In a recorded passage, Levi says: "I transmitted a message to the secretary of state that responsibility, ties, and interests call for

renewed efforts to strengthen Israeli-U.S. ties, to eliminate misunderstandings, to lower tensions, and, more than anything else, to continue cooperation based on mutual interests."]

**Arens To Broach Issue With Cheney**  
*TA1203093792 Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT  
in Hebrew 12 Mar 92 pp 1, 13*

[Report by Shim'on Schiffer]

[Excerpt] "Syria's procurement of sophisticated weapons systems is a source of concern to us, and I will raise this issue during my conversation with U.S. Defense Secretary Richard Cheney next week," Defense Minister Moshe Arens told *YEDI'OT AHARONOT* last night before leaving for the United States.

The defense minister will stay in the United States for a week as the guest of the United Jewish Appeal. He will meet with Cheney next Monday [16 March].

Commenting on the reports about the shipment of North Korean Scud-C missiles to Iran and Syria, the defense minister said: "This issue has been troubling us, and, for the past several months, we have been in contact with various countries to curb the export of sophisticated weapons to the Middle East."

One of the main issues Arens will raise in his talks in the United States will be the military cooperation between the two countries. According to him, "strategic cooperation was not and is not at all affected by the developments in the political process." [passage omitted]

[Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew on 12 March carries a report by 'Aqiva Eldar and Eytan Rabin on page A2 adding that "Arens is accompanied by his assistant Salay Meridor; media adviser Dani Nave; and Colonel Ze'ev Hefetz, his aide-de-camp.]

**Ben-Elisar on U.S. 'Impotence'**  
*TA1203103192 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew  
12 Mar 92 p A2*

[Report by Eytan Rabin]

[Text] "The fact that a ship carrying Scuds from North Korea evaded U.S. Navy surveillance should be viewed very seriously. If the Americans cannot prevent the supply of missiles to Iran and Syria, what can they do about Iraq? It is a manifestation of their impotence, which is definitely worrisome." That statement was made last night by Knesset Member Eliyahu Ben-Elisar, chairman of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, in an interview with HA'ARETZ.

On the other hand, Ben-Elisar said, Israel can only trust itself and must see to it that missiles do not strike its territory again.

Israel is following with concern the supply of Scud missiles to Iran and Syria and is apprehensive about

possible cooperation between the two countries that could affect the situation in Lebanon and increase Hizballah's terrorist attacks.

**'Disgraceful U.S. Failure' Seen**  
*TA1203100392 Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT  
in Hebrew 12 Mar 92 p 2*

[Editorial: "Hide-and-Seek in the Gulf"]

[Text] The ease with which the North Korean Scud cargo ship slipped through the chain of U.S. Navy vessels on the edges of the Persian Gulf embarrassed the administration. Its spokesmen made a significant effort yesterday to argue that this was not a disgraceful U.S. failure.

Nevertheless, if this was not a failure caused by negligence, was the negligence planned ahead of time?

U.S. spokesmen admitted that the U.S. vessels had no legal authority to intercept the Scud ship and confiscate its cargo, unless it was destined for Iraq. Because the cargo was destined for Syria or Iran, there was no way to prevent the ship from continuing on its course even if it had been stopped. Under these circumstances, the Americans may have decided that it would be less of a fiasco if the freighter were not stopped at all.

The affair raises worrisome doubts regarding the role of "the policeman of the world" which the United States assumed in the wake of the Gulf war. It no longer matters whether it is an impotent cop (in which case one may well wonder about the quality of its embargo on Iraq) or a dishonest cop, willing to turn a blind eye when a crime is committed.

Either way, it is not good—primarily for us.

**'Additional' Vessel En Route to Iran**  
*TA1103193892 Jerusalem Israel Television Network  
in Hebrew 1900 GMT 11 Mar 92*

[Text] Our Arab affairs correspondent Ehud Ya'ari reports that as far as is known an additional Korean vessel is making its way to Iran, but it is not clear what its cargo is. The Korean vessel which docked today at Bandar 'Abbas has still not begun to unload its cargo of missiles. It has now been learned that a Korean vessel which had earlier docked at the port did not carry missiles as had previously been thought.

## PAKISTAN

**Spokesman on Indian Nonproliferation Stand**  
*BK1103150692 Islamabad PTV Television Network  
in English 1415 GMT 11 Mar 92*

[Text] Pakistan has again said that it will continue to work for ensuring nuclear nonproliferation in South Asia on the basis of an equitable and nondiscriminatory

nuclear regime. This was stated by a Foreign Office spokesman in Islamabad today. He was asked to comment on the Indian foreign secretary's statement in Washington that India would not sign the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty and would not attend the five-nation conference on nuclear nonproliferation in South Asia. He said full text of the Indian secretary's press talk is awaited.

About Afghanistan, the spokesman said there has not been any change in Pakistan's official position which is committed to a peaceful settlement of the Afghan problem. He said there is no role for Najibullah in the proposed Afghan assembly and in the interim government. The UN secretary general's proposal includes the transfer of total executive power from the present regime to the interim government as soon as it is established. He said the Afghan assembly is expected to be convened in the second half of next month.

The spokesman said Pakistan will look after Iranian interests in Washington in response to a request made by the Government of Iran in this respect. The spokesman said previously the Iranian interests were looked after by Algeria.

The spokesman said Pakistan has expressed its concern to the Burmese Government over the plight of the Muslim minority in Burma.

**Spokesman on 'Full Safeguards' at Nuclear Plant**  
*BK0903070492 Islamabad Radio Pakistan Network  
in Urdu 0600 GMT 9 Mar 92*

[Text] A spokesman of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission [PAEC] has said that the Karachi Nuclear Power Plant [KANUPP] is continuously functioning with full safeguards under tight security. Refuting some press reports about inadequate safeguards at the plant, the spokesman said that various missions of experts from the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] have been regularly inspecting the KANUPP and have independently acknowledged that the procedures and safeguards adopted at the plant fully conform to international standards for safeguards and procedures. The spokesman assured that PAEC will continue a close watch on the operation and maintenance of the plant, adding that the IAEA will also be included in this process so an independent review can be made in this regard.

**Foreign Ministry's Churkin Holds News Conference**

**Views Arms Sales**

*OW0403165092 Moscow INTERFAX in English  
1609 GMT 4 Mar 92*

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Excerpt] On March 11, during Andrey Kozyrev's visit to Belgium which will be part of his upcoming European tour, the Russian and US foreign ministers will discuss preparations for Boris Yeltsin's visit to the US, scheduled for June 16 and 17, Russian Foreign Ministry's spokesman Vitaliy Churkin said at a briefing on Wednesday [4 March].

Vitaliy Churkin also denied reports concerning the Russian leaders' plans to sell arms to Taiwan. He said, however, that Russia will possibly sell arms to Cuba for hard currency. [passage omitted]

**Cuba, Taiwan Potential Buyers**

*LD0503110192 Moscow TASS International Service  
in Russian 1620 GMT 4 Mar 92*

[By Boris Krivoshey and Sergey Staroselskiy, TASS diplomatic correspondents]

[Excerpts] Moscow, 4 Mar (ITAR-TASS)—Russian Federation Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev is leaving on a tour of some European countries tomorrow, Vitaliy Churkin, head of the Information Directorate of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs [MID], noted at a briefing here today. [passage omitted]

Speaking about the trip to the DPRK by the chief of General Staff of the CIS United Armed Forces, the MID representative refuted an *IZVESTIYA* report that "an agreement on military and technical cooperation" had been signed there. The only document signed there, he said, was a schedule for traditional exchange of delegations between the two armies.

Arms trade has not only a commercial but also a political side. The final decision on arms sale is made by the political leadership, Vitaliy Churkin went on. He was answering a question from the ITAR-TASS correspondent regarding an interview by Sergey Glazyev, Russian Federation first deputy minister for foreign economic ties, to the *ASAHI* Japanese newspaper. The deputy minister asserted that Russia is not going to export weapons to Cuba since "it has no possibility of paying for deliveries in hard currency" and he described Taiwan as a potential buyer of Russian weapons.

Be it Cuba or any other country: "It is not our business to count money in other people's pockets." As for the other side of the issue, "Russia's political leadership has no intention of selling arms to Taiwan," the MID representative stressed. [passage omitted]

**Russia's Uranium Sales to U.S. Viewed**

*PM0603145792 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA  
in Russian 5 Mar 92 p 2*

[Report by correspondent I. Alekseyenko: "For Sale to America"]

[Text] Krasnokamensk, Chita Oblast—I recall from childhood the terrifying tales of criminals sentenced to death who are sent to the uranium mines. They are going to die anyway, people said, at least this way they will live a little longer and be of use.

The reality proved far more prosaic. In the mines, with lighting and ventilation that would be the envy of many city avenues, ordinary people mine uranium in special overalls and rubber boots and with respirators over their faces.

They are mining uranium ore in a town lost among the Transbaykal steppes. It began to be erected floor by floor, house by house, in the sixties, on an empty site. And it received its name from a nearby settlement—Krasnokamensk. Only yesterday it was closed and secret yet today the hotels are overflowing. People are traveling from every kray and village.

I was brought here by a report which has flown around all the mass media—the Russians are engaging in dumping on the uranium market. Dumping means that they are eliminating competitors by offering a commodity cheaply, or to put it more simply, at give-away prices. No one has emphasized the actual commodity but I must admit that my blood ran cold—we are selling uranium!

So I am standing outside bars of the kind which are used in Russia to protect kitchen gardens and pioneer camps. Yet behind them is uranium in barrels with foreign inscriptions ready for shipment to the United States. This was explained to me by G.N. Kolov, the plant's deputy chief engineer, while we were still traveling there. Now he has fallen silent, is frowning, and has even taken a few steps to one side. Does he feel awkward and pained or does he feel to hell with it all, as they say?

"You know," he answers my question with another, "that a considerable proportion of the uranium purchased by the Americans throughout the world is not processed but stored for a long time? They are mining virtually none of their own uranium, they are saving it for later, mindful of the future."

I admit that I was prepared to hear anything from Kolov but not this self-exposing statement. So he felt hurt and pained. What about the combine's general director, S.S. Pokrovskiy, with whom I still had to speak, I thought.

I had heard and read about this almost legendary man. But I had never met with him. I knew that he has been in Krasnokamensk from the first days and is a fanatic, a demanding, intelligent leader, a direct and sometimes

sharp man. He knows like no one else the true price of this literally and figuratively heavy metal. Can it be measured in U.S. dollars?

Pokrovskiy, when I turned the talk toward this, looked at me gravely, sullenly, and kept quiet. The awkward pause was interrupted by his deputy B.N. Zizdo, who was present at the talk:

"We did not have much choice: Either sell uranium abroad or wind up production. Russia turned out not to need the uranium: The financing of the mining was stopped last year. We barely survived: We had to temporarily shut down five mines."

"And that meant hundreds and hundreds of people out of work," S.S. Pokrovskiy spoke, interrupting his deep thought. "Building up production was complicated, curtailing it even more so. I could not bear to look people in the eye."

Since 1987 there has been a reduction in the state order for uranium mined by the Krasnokamensk workers. The town was in ferment, the prospect of unemployment loomed clearly and irreversibly before many people. In Moscow Pokrovskiy was repeatedly told about conversion and its importance for the national economic complex, but they gave no money for the proposed projects. Get it yourself, they said, seek out reserves. Last year poverty took the entire combine collective by the throat and following it the whole city. Salvation came from "over the hill:" The Americans were interested in the uranium which no one needed in our own fatherland. The deal was struck and currency flowed into the combine.

Citing commercial secrecy, they would not tell me how much had been sold and at what price. At the combine the dumping accusation is considered unfounded and dictated by the desire of rival firms to obscure the issue. The Western market has not been uncontrolled for a long time, as some home-grown experts try to portray it; it is a well-organized and regulated structure. The appearance of Russian uranium on this market has caused commotion in some business circles. Long-term business contacts began to split and a mechanism of pressure was put into operation against the "interloper." The accusation of dumping, so voluptuously taken up by many of our publications, is only a small part of it.

Yet it was currency which was the nuclear power workers' main revenue last year. Today Pokrovskiy and his team feel they are winning. They are mining coal, developing zeolite deposits, and have launched an electrical engineering plant. Next is a plant for the production of ion-exchange resins.

"But the main thing" the general director believes, "is that we have succeeded in retaining the basic production and collective. We shall still serve the country."

Here the sale of uranium abroad is regarded as supremely immoral. It was not easy to burden their souls

with such a grave sin, but the threatened production stoppage seemed even more dangerous. In the general confusion and chaos people have lived, and live, in hope of serving the country. We shall not seek those to blame for selling off everything—that is futile. It is better, by approaching the matter from the other side, to look at who stands to gain.

In Krasnokamensk I heard an unexpected version of the Chernobyl catastrophe: It was not an accident, I was assured, but a well-planned act of subversion. Had I heard this while waiting in line for gasoline I would have dismissed it, but in this case specialists were insisting on it. Following the catastrophe a campaign was launched in the country against nuclear power stations under construction and already operating: They were closed down wholesale, counter to logic and common sense, without creating or even suggesting anything to replace them. Yet whether we want it or not the future belongs to nuclear power engineering. So far there is simply no fitting alternative, nor is one foreseen in the immediate future. Incidentally, the West understands this very well, assertively and steadily building up its nuclear potential, and here, too, we have decided to follow our own path. Or to be more precise, we have gone off at a tangent somewhere, through an impassable barrier of fallen trees. As a result we have merely bumped our heads and now seem to be ready to return to the old road. But not a chance!

A new wave of antinuclear hysteria is imminent. Look what the newspapers are writing about—possible new accidents at nuclear electric power stations and related rumors. Tremble and be afraid, oh Russians, they are saying: The atom is a nasty thing is what they are persistently trying to din into our heads again and again. Some people are beginning to tremble severely. Again curses are raining down on the inept scientists who have lured the country into this nuclear "adventure." They have already grown tired of trying to justify themselves and have recently been directing every gaze toward the West, seeking support and understanding there. Not a shout but a persistent recommendation has already issued: Since Russia does not need you, then you are welcome with us in the United States. James Baker flew in to talk with the nuclear scientists, called them the most talented people in Russia, and made it clear that henceforth there is someone to show concern for creating normal working conditions. It is to be expected that following the Russian uranium our intellectual potential will also pour into the "land of equal opportunity." At least everything possible will be done for that. Naturally under the flag of protecting the interests of world civilization and humanism.

The United States today is concerned mainly with one thing—the monopolization of the power and influence of the destroyed Union. The former Ministry of Medium Machine Building is one of the choicest morsels here.

I am sure that insight will come to us. But will it not be too late?

**Nuclear Talks on Korean Peninsula Discussed**

*SK1003121792 Moscow Radio Moscow in Korean  
1000 GMT 9 Mar 92*

[“Talk” by station commentator Viktor Valentinov on inter-Korean contacts on the nuclear issue from the “Focus on Asia” program]

[Text] The North and South delegates are expected to meet for the sixth round of contacts to be held in Panmunjom on 10 March to discuss the nuclear safeguards issue. No success has been assured in the five rounds of prior talks. The two sides have failed to reach any agreement. Our station commentator, Viktor Valentinov, writes on this issue as follows:

The North and the South agreed on this issue in principle, but differences of opinion continue over the technical matters.

The North and the South this year signed the Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, and Exchange and Cooperation and the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. These documents were soon ratified and began to go into effect. Based on this, the inter-Korean dialogue was expected to proceed very smoothly. However, though the historically significant agreement was made, the distrust between the North and the South was not eliminated. This distrust, which has continued for half a century, may not be dissolved overnight.

The issue of nuclear inspection, which is to be discussed at Panmunjom, will be for the realization of the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. This inspection is designed to ensure that nuclear development is intended solely for peaceful purposes. Therefore, simultaneous inspection of the nuclear facilities of the North and the South has been proposed.

Pyongyang wants to verify that Seoul has completely eliminated U.S. nuclear weapons from the South, and Seoul wants to obtain accurate data of the DPRK nuclear facilities from nuclear inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA].

Some Western media even claim that the North has already developed nuclear weapons. Pyongyang denies this report, and Seoul demands that this denial be proven.

This mutual distrust makes the talks difficult. Each country wants to display its good intentions on its own with unimpaired honor and without being forced. However, the two sides seem to be attempting to put pressure on each other. It seems that the South is applying more pressure, which inspires confrontation, than the North is.

Seoul, following the United States, demands that the North subject its nuclear facilities to international inspection no later than 18 March. The North in response says that the nuclear safeguards agreement signed with the IAEA will not be ratified by the DPRK

Supreme People's Assembly [SPA] until 10 April. Since Pyongyang has set this schedule, it will not change it. However, Seoul complains about this. The U.S. media, in the meantime, are spreading the report that the North is delaying the inspection of its facilities to develop its nuclear weapons by this summer. Seoul, as if convinced by this report, insists on the deadline of 18 March like an ultimatum. The North warns that if this pressure continues, talks will be even more difficult.

In the meantime, Seoul and Washington are raising their threatening tone even more. With this mutual distrust and disregarding the other party's will, the talks could be disrupted completely. Who will benefit from this?

**DPRK Envoy on ‘Secret’ Nuclear Depot in ROK**

*SK1203034992 Moscow Radio Moscow in Korean  
1000 GMT 10 Mar 92*

[Report on news conference by Son Song-pil, DPRK ambassador to Russia, at the DPRK Embassy in Moscow on 9 March; from the “Focus on Asia” program]

[Text] A thief is shouting “Stop, thief!” Seoul's position on the nuclear issue was so described at a news conference that took place at the DPRK Embassy in Moscow on 9 March. Speaking to reporters from CIS media, Ambassador Son Song-pil explained this description using a newly disclosed fact.

First, this statement is related to a recent statement by Chong Chu-yong, former honorary chairman of Hyundai Group and president of the Unification National Party. He said in Seoul that Hyundai Group had participated in a project to build a secret depot for storing U.S. nuclear shells. This statement gave a basis for the DPRK to doubt the completion of the withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons from the ROK and to denounce the ROK for trying to frighten its people about the nuclear threat from the North. At the same time, this assessment of the ROK's (?commercial) activities is the DPRK's response to the campaign by the United States and the ROK to speed up the DPRK's ratification of the nuclear safeguards accord signed with the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA]. This ratification will make it possible for the IAEA to inspect nuclear facilities in North Korea.

In this way, Pyongyang reconfirmed that it would not tolerate any pressure to speed up the opening of Pyongyang's nuclear facilities to international inspection. Son Song-pil, DPRK ambassador to Russia, said:

[Begin Son Song-pil recording] The South Korean authorities have proposed that the trial inspection of one or two facilities in the North and South be conducted first. This proposal has become meaningless.

We and the South Korean authorities released the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. However, the South Korean authorities have

declined to fully implement this declaration but continuously insisted that the North and South select one or two facilities and conduct trial inspections of them. This [secret nuclear depot construction project] more clearly shows why, even after the North and South adopted the agreement and the joint denuclearization declaration, the South Korean authorities have accused us of building nuclear weapons, why they have babbled that they cannot implement the agreements, and why they loudly babbled that they would impose sanctions on us.

This also clearly shows why, even while keeping the U.S. nuclear depot hidden in South Korea, they have found fault with us and continuously alleged that we are building nuclear weapons, and why they have continuously insisted that all the problems be solved through trial inspection.

Because it was revealed that there is a secret depot for storing U.S. nuclear weapons in South Korea, we demand that overall inspection of the U.S. forces and nuclear bases be conducted, not a trial inspection of one or two facilities, as the South Korean authorities have insisted. [end recording]

Referring to the DPRK's ratification of the nuclear safeguards accord, Ambassador Son Song-pil said:

[Begin recording] The third session of the Ninth Supreme People's Assembly will take place on 8 April, and the ratification of the nuclear safeguards accord will be formally deliberated there. Upon deliberation, we will officially notify the IAEA that the nuclear safeguards accord will become effective. Upon notification, the nuclear safeguards accord will be effective in our country, and the nuclear inspection of us by the IAEA can be conducted on dates and according to procedures to be agreed on between us and the IAEA. [end recording]

Finally, we recall that the IAEA has no authority to inspect the U.S. military bases in the ROK. The North-South Joint Nuclear Control Committee can do so. The North-South Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean peninsula contains a clause on this committee's formation. Discussions have been under way to implement this declaration.

### Russia, Cuba Discuss Finishing Nuclear Plant

OW103163692 Moscow INTERFAX in English  
1406 GMT 11 Mar 92

[From the "Diplomatic Panorama" feature by diplomatic correspondents M. Mayorov, I. Porshnev, and others; transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Russia intends to conclude the construction of a nuclear-power plant in Jaragua, Cuba. According to information DP [Diplomatic Panorama] received at Russia's Foreign Ministry and Ministry of Nuclear-Power Engineering, this issue is under discussion at the

talks in Moscow with a Cuban delegation led by Enrique Melendez, chairman of the State Committee for External Economic Ties.

E. Melendez conferred with Deputy Prime Minister Yegor Gaydar. At their talks in Russia's Ministry of External Economic Relations, the two sides are discussing a continuation of Russia's participation in the building of a number of facilities in Cuba, such as the nuclear-power plant in Jaragua. As DP's correspondent was told, Russia and Cuba expressed interest in continuing this kind of cooperation, but on a new economic basis.

Participants in the talks are trying to find the ways to overcome the financial and technical difficulties that emerged during the construction of the nuclear-power plant. As DP was told at the Ministry of Nuclear-Power Engineering, Russia proceeds from the assumption that Cuba must shoulder in the future all hard-currency expenses connected with the project. For instance, an automatic system for monitoring the technological process might be purchased from the German company "Siemens" with funds Cuba will get from its own sources. The two sides are to discuss in more detail the prospects for concluding the construction of the plant in Jaragua during a visit to Cuba by a group of Russian experts led by Yevgeniy Reshetnikov, deputy minister of nuclear-power engineering. The visit is scheduled for March 26.

### French Official Urges Nonproliferation Treaty

OW0403141492 Moscow INTERFAX in English  
1256 GMT 4 Mar 92

[From "Diplomatic Panorama"; transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] France is interested in Tajikistan's joining the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, said its Secretary of State for foreign affairs Alain Vivien at a meeting with President Rakhman Nabiyev in Dushanbe on Tuesday [3 March]. According to him, this should be done since Tajikistan has on its soil a uranium enriching plant, even though formally it has no nuclear weapons.

The same day A. Vivien conferred with the leaders of local opposition parties who urged the West to refrain from establishing "diplomatic and other relations with Tajikistan where power is still in the hands of the communists and where human rights are violated".

For his part A. Vivien said that his country wishes to establish relations with a state, not government. According to him "governments come and go, while the people and state remain". France, he pointed out, wants to cooperate with the people of Tajikistan who have ancient culture and centuries-old traditions.

**Brazil Interested in Employing Space Experts**

*LD1103222792 Moscow Radio Rossii Network  
in Russian 0900 GMT 11 Mar 92*

[Text] Brazil is showing great interest in CIS scientists to work for its national space program. As Brazilian papers reported on Tuesday [10 March], the Brazilian Technological Aeronautics Institute is concluding contracts with Commonwealth scientists. It is assumed that a group of 20-25 space specialists will be looked for in the CIS to sign contracts. They are expected to arrive in Brazil this year. At first the experts from the former USSR will lecture and conduct practical training, and later they will help the space program itself. According to local media, the salary of the CIS scientists will be \$2,000. Commenting on the reports, a Brazilian Foreign Ministry spokesman pointed out that it was not a question of the scientists emigrating but of signing temporary contracts.

**Uranium Exports Planned; Libyan Group Visits**

*92U50195A Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English  
No 3, 19-26 Jan 92 p 5*

[Text] 1. It has been a long-standing dream of the Islamic world to have its own nuclear arsenal. After the defeat of Saddam Husayn, Rakhman Nabiiev may be the leader who could help them meet their atomic ambitions. The president of the Republic of Tajikistan, reputedly a resolute and tough leader, is increasingly winning the sympathy of Eastern leaders. It is symptomatic that Libyan leader Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi was one of the first to congratulate the president of Tajikistan on his election. As a result, NARODNAYA GAZETA, published in Dushanbe, carried a sensational article. Its author maintains that the future of uranium mines and uranium enrichment plants in Northern Tajikistan is being discussed in the lobby of the republican government. Their goal is to sell enriched uranium, a kilogram of which sells on the world market for 100,000 U.S. dollars, or to set up a consortium with rich Arab countries to develop uranium deposits. The article presupposes that this programme will be discussed at the upcoming talks.

2. It is worth mentioning that the article appeared the day a delegation of the Libyan Jamahiriyah left Dushanbe. SADOI MARDUM (PEOPLE'S VOICE), the newspaper of the republican Supreme Soviet, reported that the delegation was headed by Dr. Muhammad Ahmad Sharif, secretary general of the International Islamic Call Society, the third man in Libya's state hierarchy.

3. A Letter of Intent was signed in Dushanbe. In the opinion of Khodzhi Akbar Turadzhon-zade, who received the delegation, the meeting only concerned the establishment of good-neighbourly relations between the two Moslem states, not the sale of uranium. At the session MP [member of parliament] Khodzhi Akbar

Turadzhon-zade made an inquiry regarding the publication in NARODNAYA GAZETA, but authorities did not respond to it.

4. What makes the situation remarkable is the fact that the item appeared in a publication considered not long ago the main newspaper of the republic's communists. It is strictly controlled by the government and usually expresses an official viewpoint. During the recent election campaign, it succeeded in shaping public opinion in favour of the current president, Rakhman Nabiiev. It is moreover surprising that with this article the paper dealt an unmistakable blow to the president's prestige, putting him on the same level as Saddam Husayn.

5. What's more, the author of the item used his pen name, thereby giving rise to many questions: Was it a newspaper canard exaggerating the real events, an attempt to put President Nabiiev in a bad light in the eyes of the West and Russia, made by the supporters of former President Kakhkhar Makhkamov, or was it an international leak of information to prevent the alliance taking shape in reality?

6. The official authorities do not respond to this question. So far they have not reacted to the sensation published in NARODNAYA GAZETA. What is obvious is that after the collapse of the USSR the economy of Tajikistan is in such a deplorable condition that exports of raw material resources will become inevitable in the absence of other sources of income. The degree of respectability of Tajikistan's future partners is not so much a matter of commerce, as of the international prestige of Tajikistan on the eve of its recognition by the world community.

**Uranium Smugglers Caught in Germany  
'Amateurs'**

*PM1203163992 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian  
11 Mar 92 Morning Edition p 6*

[Yevgeniy Bovkun report: "Failed Uranium Deal in Bavaria"]

[Excerpts] Bonn—The speculators were caught red-handed, engaged in shady dealings, you might say. An investigation has started. So journalists have thus far been given only the most general information at the Bavarian Land's crime department.

There were two of them—Germans with a poor command of German, settlers from our homeland. They had already prepared the commodity: small pellets of enriched uranium one cm in diameter with a total weight of 1.2 kg. Housed in a metal vessel and screened by lead sheets, the uranium was in a sports bag stowed in a car trunk. [passage omitted]

Fortunately for the luckless dealers the percentage enrichment of their uranium proved low—2.8 percent—and the radioactivity was not a danger to health. Experts

maintain that to produce an atom bomb, let us say, would require 100 kg of uranium with an enrichment level of over 20 percent.

It is to be supposed that those detained were amateurs. But this was the full extent of the funny side of the situation. The matter takes a serious turn because the police are sure that there are more experienced and dangerous persons behind "our" dealers. It cannot be ruled out that they were merely trying to "sound out" the possibilities of the German market.

Bavarian Interior Minister E. Stoiber believes that there will be no "nuclear mafia" in this federal land and that the police will not allow criminals to develop.

The Bavarian police had been tailing our two former compatriots. The first information that they intended to trade in uranium was received at the beginning of February. The Bavarian Interior Ministry hopes that the speculators will put the police on the trail of their accomplices. But there is still cause for alarm. [passage omitted]

#### Japanese Rumors of Nuclear Brain Drain Viewed

PM0903114792 Moscow *IZVESTIYA* in Russian  
6 Mar 92 Morning Edition p 1

[Kim Smirnov report: "Russian Physicists Consider 'Nuclear' Brain Drain Rumors Absurd"]

[Text] Despite major measures taken by Russia, Germany, and the United States to preserve the intellectual potential of the former USSR's nuclear scientists and switch it to peaceful scientific problems, the fuss in the world's press over the supposed participation of our scientists in creating a nuclear bomb for a foreign state continues unabated.

For example, in the Japanese mass media there have been reports that the Russian Government is examining the question of selling nuclear materials abroad and considers Japan a potential customer.

In the first place, the sale of nuclear materials is not the same as the sale of nuclear military secrets, and in the second place, there have been no such inquiries from Moscow. Japan itself has no specific plans to buy Russia's surplus stocks of plutonium created during the reduction of its strategic nuclear arms. Kanzo Tanigawa, director general of the Japan Science and Technology Agency, has officially stated that.

However, despite the official statements the uproar in the press and on the air waves is not diminishing. Here is an extract from a recent report from Tokyo (ITAR-TASS correspondent Vasiliy Golovnin): "After the second 'oil shock' at the end of the seventies, uranium traded at \$43 a pound (453.6 grams). In the first half of the eighties, the price for uranium fluctuated around \$19-\$17. After 1989, however, the price fell sharply when the Soviet Union began to increase its supplies to the world market

by means of one-off deals aimed at replenishing its dwindling reserves of convertible currency. Since then nuclear power station fuel has steadily dropped in price and in January 1992 was down to \$8 a pound.

"At present this trend is being accelerated by reports that Russia is going to release into the market enriched uranium and plutonium extracted from warheads during the forthcoming major reduction of nuclear missiles. In Japan, specifically, they are already drawing up plans to use this fuel to produce energy in specially designed reactors."

Let us reiterate: The international trade in nuclear materials and the leak of national nuclear secrets are completely different things. Nevertheless, too often in the mass media recently there has been an abundance of rumors and fabrications about Soviet physicists prepared to sell themselves to the "yellow devil" (what color is he now?) and make whatever he wants. Even an atom bomb.

But what do our scientists themselves think? This morning the editorial office received a statement from Russian physicists signed by Academician Ponomarev-Stepnay, president of the Nuclear Society; S. Kapitsa, president of the Physics Society; and V. Mikhaylin, president of the Russian Physics Society. They write: "Recently in the mass media there have been a number of reports that physicists engaged in nuclear weapons research have been receiving offers of employment in countries interested in creating an atom bomb. Fears have been expressed that the participation of nuclear scientists from the former Soviet Union in the military programs of Third World countries could become a reality in the near future.

"We, the presidents of nongovernment organizations uniting specialists from a broad range of fields of contemporary physics and technology, are empowered to state that there is no reason to doubt the personal and professional responsibility of our colleagues or of nuclear specialists in the United States, Britain, France, or China who are working on nuclear weapons."

#### Physicist Examines Reasons for Brain Drain

OW1303015492 Moscow Central Television First Program and *Orbita* Networks in Russian  
1900 GMT 2 Mar 92

[Interview with Vitaliy Ivanovich Ginsberg, academician and physicist, by Mikhail Solntsev in Moscow; from the "Utro" program—live]

[Excerpt] [Solntsev] Recently there have been many press reports saying that a brain drain is about to occur, especially in sensitive fields like nuclear physics or nuclear weapons production. We would like to discuss this subject with our guest, well-known physicist and academician Vitaliy Ginsberg.

What is your opinion on brain drain from the former Soviet Union?

[Ginsberg] I am happy to say a thing or two on the subject, since foreign correspondents have interviewed me three or four times recently, and what came out of it was complete drivel. In this sense television is much better; what one says is what everyone hears.

Anyhow, this is a very topical problem, but it consists of several parts. First, what draws most attention is the danger of specialists in the fields of both nuclear and conventional weaponry being lured away by Libya or some other country, thus creating the threat of nuclear weapons proliferation. However, I must say right away that I am in no way directly associated with this and know only a little bit about it. It is just that one of these interviews was done jointly with the representative of Arzamas-16 [Russian secret nuclear complex], so I know a thing or two. It is an important problem, but, as you know, Yeltsin visited Arzamas-16 recently, and a decision to create a center—partially financed from abroad, by the United States of America, apparently—was made. This will create pay raises and create conditions so that people will not leave. Since in one of those interviews it was stated that I knew of a case when certain people have already left, I would like to use this opportunity to say that I know of no such cases. I think that even if it has happened, it is on the whole very unlikely. The same goes for deserters.

But this is only one side of it. The side that I am more familiar with, and which seems to be more important to me, is simply the brain drain of scientific workers who do not work in the defense sector. This is especially noticeable in mathematics and theoretical physics.

There are two reasons for this. First, we have many good people in these fields. Second, it is easier for these people to adapt abroad, since they need no special facilities—all they need is a pen and some paper. In these fields, the drain is major. I know of an institute, which I would rather not name, where about 50 percent of the people are absent. True, they come and go but about half of the personnel is abroad. I think that this is totally inappropriate.

I have heard the opinion that the drain is a good thing, since otherwise these people will be wasted, and when we have paradise on earth here once again they would be able to come back. In the meantime, so this line of thinking goes, they will be able to return on visits and bring all kinds of information. I totally disagree with this view.

Of course, if the choice is leaving the institute and working in a stall or going abroad, then of course going abroad is preferable. The scientist has the chance to maintain his aptitude and to bring some knowledge with him. But it would be best not to stay abroad for too long. I endorse going abroad—to a conference, say, or maybe even for an exchange of experience—for a month or so. This is a very good thing. But as for staying abroad for

long periods—well, it is good for the one who goes since the pay there is much better. Sometimes it is also good for those paying the salaries. But I do not see any gain for our own scientific institutions from such prolonged trips.

Now, I would like to comment on the most important issue, that is, why so many of our qualified people go abroad. There are two reasons for this. First, there are many good and decent people abroad who invite and support our scientists as a kind of humanitarian aid. They see that these people's lives are bad here, so they invite them, feed them, and give them opportunities, which our scientists are happy to accept. They even recruit them in some cases.

Secondly, we have good specialists, and there is often a deficit of such good specialists abroad. Let us not forget that our science used to be very prestigious, and people wanted scientific careers for material and other reasons. Abroad, however, science is not a very prestigious occupation. Over there, a doctor, a lawyer, and certainly a businessman would be much better off. Therefore, even a rich country like the United States of America, which has a lot of universities, has a need for qualified people. Therefore, recruiting highly qualified people and supporting them is far from humanitarian aid, since they are not so easy to get.

From our country's point of view—it is not very clear which country this is, so let us suppose it is Russia, although I think that the same applies to all countries in the former USSR—the best thing would not be trips abroad but joint projects financed and aided from abroad.

But, let no one assume that I object to anyone going abroad. For example, recently I have been principally engaged in studying superconductivity. I have a very good team. I earn the equivalent of 30 dollars a month, plus food and other things. The exchange rate is fluctuating, but this is about 3,000 or 4,000 rubles. In the United States of America I would be getting 8,000 dollars a month. Obviously, if the pay here had been 8,000 dollars, not just for me but for the whole group, it would have been possible to raise their pay and support them with what it would take to pay me alone abroad. There is not enough money today, and people, especially junior staff, are hard put. They get 1,000 or less, almost below the minimum, and prices go up all the time. We could double their pay with such aid, and it is not just some sort of handout, since research results can be promptly dispatched abroad in the form of theses, suggestions, and so on, and they can gain something.

[Solntsev] All this is true, but as you know there are certain sensitive fields in science which are secret—all kinds of classified developments. If such developments are financed from abroad, will we not lose all our secrets? To create the center you mention, \$100 million was allocated for the creation of the center you were talking

about; this seems like a good thing. But it might be an attempt to take from us the few remaining secrets we still have.

[Ginsberg] This is a very specific angle of the whole affair. Almost everything used to be classified. There used to be a time when one could not find anything that was not. Fortunately, this is changing. The vast majority of developments are absolutely not secret. As for weapons—well, I do not know the details, but there is no reason to think that this center will deal with weapons. Certain buildings will simply be off limits, like in certain other places. It is all a question of rational management. There are a few real secrets, and the less real secrets one has, the more secret they become because when everything is secret, nothing is. We all know this idiotic system of ours. If the real secrets are defined, why should people dealing with them divulge them? On the contrary, what I am afraid of is that even absolutely unclassified things will be kept secret.

What is more, technology and physics develop very fast, and what used to be secret some time ago becomes obsolete. I can give you an example. I used to work for Arzamas-16, and although I was in (Fyana) at the time, I was in contact with Sakharov and his group. I was completely finished with this work in 1955, but they continued classifying me as top secret until 1987. This is complete idiocy. They had no inkling as to what was going on there, but still I was defined as classified and could not go abroad. This was the practice in those days.

We should not be worrying about them getting their hands on some secrets. Rational people can take care of this. The Lebedev Institute of Physics, where I work, is, by and large, an entirely open place. What is there to hide? After all, since we are interested in foreign developments, why should they not be interested in ours? The science develops so fast that it makes no sense to steal, even if there are people like that around. We should not assume that people are dishonest. [passage omitted]

#### Russian Nuclear Physicists on Recruitment

LD0603170392 Moscow TASS in English  
1205 GMT 6 Mar 92

[Text] Moscow March 6 ITAR-TASS—Follows the full text of a statement by physicists of Russia signed by Sergey Kapitsa, president of the Physical Society, Nikolay Ponomarev-Stepnay, president of the Nuclear Society, Vitaliy Mikhailin, president of the Physical Society of Russia:

Recently in the mass media a number of reports have appeared stating that nuclear physicists engaged in research on nuclear weapons are receiving offers to work in countries interested in building atom bombs. Feelings of danger have been expressed, that activities of nuclear physicists from the former Soviet Union in the military programs of countries of the Third World may become a reality in the near future.

We, presidents of nongovernmental societies, uniting scientists and engineers engaged in research in many fields of modern physics and technology are stating that there is no more reason to question the personal and professional integrity and responsibility of our colleagues, than that of the specialists from the U.S.A., the U.K., France and China, where work on nuclear research is conducted.

At the same time, the status and support of scientists and engineers working in fields using recent developments of physics, including specialists in nuclear energy, provides cause for concern. Recent events show that this concern is shared by the Russian Government, which has taken a number of steps to resolve social, economic and organizational problems connected with the conversion of the nuclear industrial complex. We welcome also the initiatives of Western politicians directed to the full utilization of the professional knowledge of specialists from atomic science and industry.

There is no doubt that the preservation and development of the scientific, technological and intellectual potential is the most necessary requisite to bring our country out of the present crisis.

#### Kravchuk Suspends Removal of Nuclear Weapons

LD1203182992 Moscow TASS International Service  
in Russian 1808 GMT 12 Mar 92

[By UKRINFORM correspondents Viktor Demidenko and Aleksey Petrunya]

[Excerpt] Kiev, 12 Mar (TASS)—While not changing the overall policy that Ukraine is seeking to become a nuclear-free, nonaligned power, we are making alterations to its implementation. A decision has been made to suspend the removal of tactical nuclear weapons. Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk made this statement at a news conference in Kiev today. Explaining this stance, he commented: There are powerful nuclear forces on the territory of the republic, and Ukraine bears an extremely high responsibility for their fate. Because of the political instability and confusion that have developed, Kravchuk noted, we cannot be certain that the missiles being sent away by us are being destroyed and not falling into unfriendly hands. We are in favor of the process of removal and destruction of nuclear weapons being placed under international control, the president stressed.

Leonid Kravchuk stated that Ukraine considers the capacity of the nuclear arsenal destruction works located in Russia inadequate. Therefore, in the president's opinion, Ukraine has the right to have an equivalent enterprise on its own territory. It will most probably be located in the Chernobyl zone. This enterprise could also undertake the processing of waste from Ukraine's nuclear power stations, since Russia is now refusing to make its territory available for these purposes, he said.

Ukraine has requested a number of countries to assist in setting up an international nuclear center on its territory. [passage omitted]

### Russia Rules Out Nuclear Arms Use in Caucasus

#### Vice President Rutskoy Comments

LD1103191292 Moscow Russian Television Network  
in Russian 1700 GMT 11 Mar 92

[Interview with Russian Vice President Aleksandr Rutskoy by correspondent Grigoryev from the "Vesti" newscast; place and date not given—recorded]

[Text] [Rutskoy] Transcaucasian Military District troops should be immediately withdrawn from Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. Those are sovereign states: sovereign Azerbaijan, sovereign Armenia, sovereign Georgia. Let them sort it out between themselves. But it is high time we stopped making the Armed Forces hostage. Accordingly, I sent a telegram to [Armenian President] Ter-Petrosyan today. Maybe it was a rather rigid telegram that demanded that the hostages be released immediately. The hostages are still alive.

[Grigoryev] Are there any nuclear weapons in Armenia and Azerbaijan?

[Rutskoy] Of course there are. But I am 100-percent certain that the fact that these weapons may be accessed or used can virtually be ruled out.

[Grigoryev] So in other words the danger of them being seized is ruled out?

[Rutskoy] Yes, it is ruled out. Relevant instructions are already in place there and will not allow that to happen.

#### General: No Nuclear Arms in Caucasus

OW1203113492 Moscow INTERFAX in English  
1039 GMT 12 Mar 92

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The declaration of Vice-President Aleksandr Rutskoy about nuclear weapons in the former Soviet republics of Transcaucasus indicates the lack of agreement in the functioning of two agencies: the office of the vice-president and the chief command of the Joint Armed Forces. The opinion was expressed by Lieutenant-General Vladimir Korotkov, the deputy chief of the Main Department of the Joint Armed Forces. He expressed readiness to report to the vice-president exact data about the places of storage and the schedule of withdrawal of nuclear weapons from the Transcaucasian Military District.

General Korotkov assured that the last nuclear charges were removed from Transcaucasia in summer 1990.

### Businessmen Attempt To Sell Nuclear Materials

LD1203101292 Moscow TASS International Service  
in Russian 0530 GMT 12 Mar 92

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Valeriy Loskutov]

[Text] Oslo, 12 March (TASS)—The attempt by Russian businessmen to sell heavy water and other materials which could be used to manufacture nuclear weaponry—this is no newspaper spoof but terrible reality. This is the conclusion arrived at by BERGENS TIDENDE, which several days ago was one of the first to report the existence of these plans.

Continuing its own investigations, on 10 March the paper published a copy of a telegram from Volgograd which was received by fax at a Norwegian firm with an offer and detailed terms of sale. The contents of the telegram are evidence that businessmen from southern Russia know their way around in the kind of deal they envisage. They intend to sell the heavy water on which two reactors—taken out of service two years ago in the area of Volgograd—operated. Six to eight tons of this strategic raw material at a price of around \$460 per kg are being offered to be sent to Murmansk and then to Norway.

Moreover, the Volgograd dealers also are prepared to dump red mercury at \$240,000 per kg. It was planned to deliver it to Norway via Vienna in consignments of five kg in the second and third quarters of this year.

In the opinion of Norwegian experts, the goods offered are important components used for the creation of nuclear weaponry. Six to eight tons of heavy water is sufficient for the operation of a reactor producing nuclear fuel. To build such a reactor now does not require the most advanced technology, and moreover many unemployed, highly skilled experts from the former Soviet Union have appeared on the labor market, BERGENS TIDENDE reports.

The paper does not name the Norwegian firm, reporting only that it has previous connections with Russia. Norwegian Foreign Minister Thorvald Stoltenberg was informed of this episode—which the Norwegian police and counterintelligence have been working on—two weeks ago. The Norwegian side, however, did not raise this question in the course of the 8 March visit to Norway by Andrey Kozyrev, the foreign minister of the Russian Federation.

### Nuclear Material Reportedly Offered for Sale

AU0903142292 Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German  
9 Mar 92 pp 176-178

[Unattributed report: "A Bomb to Bielefeld"]

[Text] The man lives, thinks, and speaks like an honest citizen from Bielefeld. With his wife and 10-month-old son, he lives in a modest house on Artur-Ladebeck

Strasse; with various partners he operates a busy travel agency and an advertising agency.

That is, if it were not for his famous name: Ernst Schliemann, 42, the great-grand nephew of the famous German archaeologist Heinrich Schliemann, who discovered Troy.

Last summer, the avid sailor (nickname "Commodore") organized the Third Baltic Traditional, a family regatta across the Baltic Sea. For the first time selected Russians participated in the regatta on old wooden yachts from the Baltic Hanseatic towns. "There they noticed me," Schliemann recalls.

In the autumn, the former Bundeswehr Navy officer searched in St. Petersburg and Moscow for the legendary "Priam's Treasure," which his ancestor had dug up in Turkey, but which was removed from Berlin by the Soviet Army in 1945. The man from Bielefeld did not find the vanished loot, but he found remnants of the import office that was the basis of Heinrich Schliemann's wealth at that time.

As a wholesale trader, the man who later became a scholar earned a fortune in St. Petersburg during the Crimean War in the middle of the last century—providing supplies to the Army.

Soon his great-grand nephew felt himself pushed in a similar direction. "At first my new acquaintances urged me to open a trading office," he reports. He was supposed to provide foodstuffs, children's clothing, and household appliances and to establish contacts on the side. Subsequently, he was offered used Polish warships.

Then in November there came the big coup in Bielefeld: A Soviet regatta participant who used to be an engineer in the GDR nuclear power plant in Greifswald told Schliemann on the phone: "We can supply everything from the military sector, including chemical agents and gases." Spent fuel rods from nuclear reactors also could be sent to Germany without any problem, circumventing Euratom and International Atomic Energy Agency controls.

Flabbergasted, the man from Bielefeld asked: "What do you mean?" On 10 December, his fax equipment received the answer. Alexander Bronstein, manager of an LTR [expansion unknown] trading company in Bad Homburg with LTR partners in St. Petersburg and Tallinn, who lives in Germany, gave him explosive information. "Our company," the emigrant wrote in almost perfect German, "already has experience in the delivery of heavy water."

In 1990 Russian LTR employee Aleksey Nikoforov said upon inquiry that the company made large-scale deliveries to Algeria. Heavy water (technical name: deuterium oxide D<sub>2</sub>O) is used as a moderator in a type of reactor that the Maghreb state currently is building with Chinese help south of the Atlas Mountains, a long way from any possible civilian use. In connection with uranium,

weapons grade plutonium can be produced quickly and without costly enrichment—the direct path to nuclear weapons.

All 143 signatory states to the nonproliferation treaty, including the Soviet Union and the FRG (but not Algeria), therefore have committed themselves to the strictest possible controls for the sale of the liquid reactor material. The deals of the Alfred Hempel Company from Duesseldorf, which helped India acquire heavy water in the early 1980's, was the reason for years for the heated debate about the proliferation of the nuclear bomb.

There certainly is explosive new material here: Following the Soviets' defeat in the arms race and the cold war, nuclear salesmen from the East are now pushing unscrupulously onto the market. At Christmas, three days before the end of the Soviet Union, LTR sent binding pricelists (\$260,000 to \$300,000 per tonne of heavy water, depending on the quality) and detailed Russian certificates to Schliemann—"quite something," according to internationally renowned nuclear expert Helmut Hirsch from Hannover.

The transport of heavy water already had started, Schliemann learned shortly afterwards; the trucks were at the Polish border. At the beginning of February, LTR says that 2.8 tonnes already were near Szczecin. Delivery could be made to any country, including to the Third World. As soon "the current offer" was "taken into consideration," Bronstein faxed, one also could deal with other "questions"—including enriched "uranium" and "centrifuges," which are further milestones for those who want to build a bomb.

Without this being any of his doing, Schliemann found himself integrated in the network of an expanding Russian nuclear Mafia, whose existence the Kremlin continues to deny officially, but which is extending its contacts more and more. Egyptian mediators, operating from Vienna, currently are making written offers in Cairo for many kilograms of highly enriched uranium and plutonium, allegedly from Soviet stocks, at the "package" price of \$180 million, including a "commission" of \$15 million.

Schliemann may have met one of the wire-pullers: Recently, without a previous appointment, a gentleman rang his doorbell, introduced himself as a former Soviet Defense Ministry employee, and presented the astonished man from Bielefeld with a list of highly pure and rare metals that could be delivered immediately and obviously from military stocks.

Through the LTR's mediation, the newly founded Russian-Belgian joint venture company Sirin called from Moscow "to discuss some questions of cooperation." Schliemann should come to Russia and the company would pay his expenses. The week before last, LTR employee Nikoforov told him that all offers that had been made so far were basically "cheap dirt." Sirin could offer "really big arms deals," which a Swiss "corporation" already is trying to obtain.

Because he "wants to show the public what is possible today" and "in order to urge NATO to react," ex-Navy officer Schliemann informed DER SPIEGEL.

At the center of the dealers' ring, in the spacious Sirin office near the Botanical Garden in Moscow, those responsible are keeping quiet. On a visit to the office, Sirin Director General Valeriy Ryumin boasts of having the "best contacts with the old structures," above all former Soviet Army officers. LTR employee Nikiforov claims that Vladimir Glotov, Ryumin's deputy, has a wide knowledge of nuclear matters for military purposes because of his professional past. However, Ryumin and Glotov prefer to keep quiet about any international deals the company has made so far. They admit only one thing: "We deal with used engine oil and metals."

**Institute Pioneers Nuclear Monitoring Equipment**  
*PM1203112192 Moscow Russian Television Network  
in Russian 1420 GMT 7 Mar 92*

[From the "M-Trust" program: Video report by A. Kondrashov and A. Svyagin, from Alma Ata]

[Text] [Kondrashov] The [Alma-Ata] Nuclear Physics Institute is well known in Kazakh scientific circles. Kurchatov himself helped establish it 35 years ago. The institute is now the biggest within the republic Academy of Sciences. It studies both purely nuclear problems such as nuclear materials technology and nuclear power engineering, as well as radiation monitoring and nuclear ecology including provision of services to affected areas, and other spheres of applied science.

[A.K. Zhetbayev, Nuclear Physics Institute director]  
Many very important radioactive preparations were not

being produced in our country. Thallium-201, for example. We were the first to produce thallium in the Union.

[Kondrashov] Thallium-201 is an indispensable preparation used in the early diagnosis of heart disease. Requests for supplies have come from a number of polyclinics in Tomsk, Tyumen, Yekaterinburg, Moscow, and St. Petersburg. There is also interest abroad.

AIDS has made it necessary to perfect sterilization of medical materials and instruments. In the civilized world gamma-rays have long been used for sterilization purposes. In our country the Alma-Ata Nuclear Physics Institute was the first to finally master this method. It makes it possible to sterilize artificial heart valves, catheters, blood transfusion instruments—in short anything that cannot be subjected to high temperatures.

People here have also found another use for gamma rays. By irradiating seeds, agricultural crop resistance and yields have been increased by 20 percent, and germination periods are being regulated. Irradiating the crops themselves can extend their storage life.

However, owing to the post-Chernobyl antinuclear mood the public's attitude toward nuclear science is one of intolerance, despite the fact that its fruits are all around us. For example, we are all familiar with ceiling-mounted fire alarms. Yet these are alpha-ray sources in which radium and plutonium is used. Someone has worked out that if all the fire alarms in Moscow were put in a heap the radiation danger would equal that of a bomb. Individually, the indicators are merely useful. Thus our fears are sometimes misplaced. Should a need nonetheless arise to monitor background radiation, the institute has developed a unique type of personal radiation meter which makes it possible simultaneously to monitor beta and gamma radiation. As such it has no parallel.

## FRANCE

### Institute Develops Atom-Level Microprobe

92AN0166A Paris SCIENCES & AVENIR in French  
Jan 92 p 9

[Text] From now on, manufacturers are going to be able to control their samples very closely; the first operational atomic microprobe is now available in France. It will make it possible to locate atomic defects in electronic components, to measure the impact of aggressive environments on metal surfaces, or, for cosmetic products, to evaluate the distribution of calcium, for example, on the cross-section of a hair.

Developed by the Center for Nuclear Studies at Bordeaux-Gradignan, the microprobe directs a particle accelerator-produced high-energy ion beam (2 million electronvolts) at the sample. The particle beam first passes through a platinum-iridium alloy diaphragm 0.01 millimeter in diameter, before being focused by four electromagnetic lenses, which reduce its size by a factor of 10. The size of the beam is thereby reduced sufficiently to gather information about the elementary make-up of the sample. The microanalysis consists in studying the results issuing from the interaction between the particles and the sample. Various analytical techniques can thus be implemented, such as measuring the backscattered ions striking the atoms of the target.

## GERMANY

### Isotope Technique Used for Uranium Enrichment

92WS0286A Paris LE MONDE in French  
21 Jan 92 p 14

[Article by Jean-Francois Augereau: "France Is Well-Positioned in Enriched Uranium Battle"]

[Text] Prime Minister Edith Cresson's visit of 20-21 January to Grenoble (Isere), Pierrelatte (Drome), and Saclay (Essonne) attests to the government's interest in two strategic sectors of the French economy: The chronically weak computers and electronic components sector, which the recent creation of a powerful group centered on Thomson and CEA-Industries (LE MONDE 20 December 1991) is expected to bolster, and that of the enrichment of uranium for nuclear power generating plants.

Despite its success<sup>(1)</sup>, the uranium enrichment sector is not as prosperous as it could be. The resurgence of new nuclear power plant construction worldwide is seemingly not imminent and the market is consequently tight. The more so in that the United States, which had at one point abandoned the development of its enrichment techniques, now wants to be in a position—in the words of former American Secretary of Energy John Herrington—to "retake the market from the French," and the Soviets, in their quest for foreign currency, are offering enriched uranium at well-below-market prices.

Survival in this market therefore depends on evolving as of now and using modern enrichment techniques—techniques capable of soon superseding the gaseous diffusion methods Eurodif and the United States have been using for years, as well as the ultracentrifugation methods on which President Saddam Hussein had cast covetous eyes for building a nuclear arsenal, and which Japan and Urenco in Europe have developed for civil purposes.

This new process, which has been dubbed SILVA<sup>(2)</sup>, is now emerging from its laboratory stage. It combines light and matter. It utilizes subtle phenomena in which lasers play the leading role and become capable of separating out of a uranium atom soup, almost one by one, those (fissionable uranium 235) atoms that are usable—though ever so rare—in nuclear power plants, from the all-too-available (uranium 238) atoms present in abundance in the ore.

### Battle of the Lasers

For the past 10 years or so, the United States has bet everything on this [laser isotope separation (LIS)] technique, which it considers the most efficient, the smallest guzzler of energy of all those in existence, and capable—it argued in 1985—of reducing the price of the finished product by half. And in June 1985 it went so far as to take the plunge of abandoning, virtually overnight, the ultracentrifugation techniques, in which it was incontestably the world leader and on which it had already spent \$3 billion. This provides some idea of the stakes in this uranium enrichment race, which will not become evident until the beginning of the next century.

Aware of this coming economic battle, the French have not kept their weapons at parade rest, and today they are emerging as the world's number two in this laser method of uranium enrichment. At the Saclay Nuclear Studies Center, which Mrs. Cresson will be visiting, teams have been working for several years on the development of this process. It is laborious, difficult, complex work, a guzzler of intellectual resources and demanding of industrialists, who, like the manufacturer of Cilas lasers, are central to the project.

It is a long road from a laboratory experiment designed to confirm the validity of the process, to the development of the physics involved, to the development of reliable equipment capable of opening the way conclusively to the construction of an industrial production unit. But everyone progresses, and Mrs. Cresson will be able to "physically touch" the SILVA-2 pilot installation in which Saclay's teams have succeeded in producing 10 grams of enriched uranium in a little over two hours.

Ten grams is not much when one thinks of the tons that Eurodif is capable of producing. But this modest stage has been determinative, since it has demonstrated the feasibility of the process and the ability of the French to control the reliability of the lasers needed for this undertaking. The desired result was not achieved, but confidence is now the rule: 30-watt industrial lasers are now

operating without a problem. Others of 100-watt capacity, have been operating for hundreds of hours now, and in the laboratory, 230-watt units have taken their first steps.

This is still insufficient, the objective being 400 watts and 1,000 hours of operation without a malfunction, in the hope of launching a production unit worthy of the name. We are advancing, therefore, in small steps, preparing for the next phase: A 250-million-franc[Fr] higher-performance pilot (ASTER [expansion not provided]) targeted for 1995-1996, and an industrial plant, to be installed at Pierrelatte between 1996 and 2001 and to be capable of producing not grams but kilos of enriched uranium.

In short, a capability of pursuing the Americans, who are capering at the head of this technique, which they already have and in which, according to the French, they enjoy "a lead of approximately five years." We cannot afford, therefore, to throw in the sponge, expecting it to bounce up and recapture the enriched uranium market. But the race cannot be run without resources that are difficult to obtain during a period of economic austerity. The budgets for the SILVA program are indeed tight when one considers that the United States invests Fr900 million annually in this field, and the Japanese between Fr500 and Fr600 million, and that the French, with only Fr300 million, are still hanging in there. Will Mrs. Cresson be receptive to this argument?

#### Footnotes

(1) Eurodif currently provides one third of the world's enrichment services. The United States provides only half the total. Their installations are growing old, uneconomic, and ill-suited to a tight market, characterized as it currently is by sizable production overcapacity.

(2) SILVA [for Laser Isotope Separation of Uranium Vapor], or ALVIS in English [as published].

#### Cabinet Adopts Report on Tighter Export Controls

LD1103151892 Berlin ADN in German  
1225 GMT 11 Mar 92

[Excerpts] Bonn (ADN)—In Bonn today, the Federal Government adopted a report on intensifying controls over exporting goods for civilian and military purposes. The report, presented by Economics Minister Juergen Moellemann, notes the tightening of export requirements since the beginning of 1989. It envisions higher penalties and sanctions, improved preventive mechanisms, and additional license requirements. Export controls were last intensified in mid-February with the adoption of the foreign trade law, which stipulates sentences of up to 15 years imprisonment for violations. [passage omitted]

The main emphasis of the report is strengthening international cooperation in the area of arms control. This

should in particular prevent the buildup of weapons of mass destruction in areas of tension by stopping the uncontrolled export of weapons.

#### Resettlers Arrested for Trying To Sell Uranium

AU1003165592 Munich SUEddeutsche ZEITUNG  
in German 10 Mar 92 p 23

[Conny Neumann report: "Police Prevent Explosive Deal"]

[Text] Augsburg—On 5 March, officials of the Land Criminal Office [LKA] and the Office for the Protection of the Constitution seized 1.2 kg of nuclear fuel in a hotel parking lot in Augsburg. The material was uranium 235 in the form of individual fuel cells, with a diameter of about one centimeter each. The uranium was in the possession of two German resettlers from the former USSR, who wanted to sell the explosive material for 1.9 million German marks [DM]. Both men, who are 42 and 36 years old, were temporarily arrested.

Regarding questions about the background of the uranium deal, the Augsburg public prosecutor's office, the LKA, and the Interior Ministry are keeping quiet. Even though the European Atomic Agency (Euratom), which has been told about the matter, also suspects that the resettlers might be couriers of an international Mafia for smuggling nuclear material, this assumption has not been officially confirmed. The LKA had a Euroatom inspector brought to Germany by plane. In a joint news statement, the investigators say that in the LKA's sector for "environmental crimes," they had received information during the beginning of February that uranium 235 would soon be illegally offered for sale in Bavaria. The clues led the LKA officials to the two Russian resettlers, who live in a reception camp in Augsburg and in a transition hostel near Regensburg. Both men were observed for weeks.

When they met in a hotel parking lot near the Augsburg-West highway exit last week, the trap was closed. The officials, who pretended to be potential buyers, impounded the fuel, which was in a sports bag in the trunk of a car. The uranium had been transported in a lead-covered metal container. During a radio interview yesterday, a Reactor Safety Society spokesman said that the material "cannot be used for bombs." Any danger to the population because of radiation can also be ruled out. In addition, the price for the "hot goods" was excessive, the expert said.

#### Origin Unclear

According to the public prosecutor's office, there is no clue to the material's origin nor have the two arrested men revealed to whom they wanted to sell the goods. The search for the men behind the deal is in full swing, it was said yesterday. An arrest warrant was issued against the dealers, who were caught in Augsburg, for "unauthorized handling of nuclear fuels." Horst Heinrich and Wilhelm

Leichtle, two Augsburg deputies of the Social Democratic Party of Germany [SPD], have meanwhile called for a "complete clearing up" of the black marketing by the Parliamentary Control Commission. They mainly want to know how the uranium could have passed customs without being discovered.

Bavarian Interior Minister Edmund Stoiber praised the investigators' successful work against the "uranium smugglers." He insisted that there will not be a "nuclear Mafia" in Bavaria. At the same time, he stressed the need for such covert investigations. The interior minister called on the SPD not to block the draft law on combating organized crime in the Bundestag any more, which permits, among other things, monitoring telephone conversations.

## TURKEY

### 'Close Watch' Maintained on CIS Missiles

NC0903153392 *Istanbul HURRIYET* in Turkish  
4 Mar 92 p 16

[Aziz Utakan report from Alma-Ata: "Ankara Maintains Surveillance on Russian Missiles"]

[Text] Turkey has placed the nuclear missiles based in the former Soviet republics under close surveillance. A special committee composed of General Staff and Foreign Ministry officials has been keeping a close watch on the Red Army's nuclear capacity and all its military hardware. A three-member Turkish military delegation is also visiting Kazakhstan to study the situation. Brigadier Ahmet Ozteker, chief of the General Staff's Disarmament and Arms Control Department, and two other high-ranking General Staff officials are holding contacts in Kazakhstan, particularly on the question of nuclear arms. The delegation arrived in Kazakhstan in civilian dress and has been holding secret talks with officials.

The three-member delegation will try to find answers to their questions about how the nuclear and conventional weapons of the Red Army and its personnel will be shared by the CIS republics. The information thus gathered will be assessed by a committee of Foreign Ministry officials to determine the kind of threat the Red Army may pose to Turkey in the future.

Although it is not yet clear whether Turkey will be able to hold similar contacts in the other CIS republics, it has been ascertained that Turkish officials will try to approach the matter from the angle of the agreement reached for mutual military cooperation.

NTIS  
ATTN: PROCESS 103  
5285 PORT ROYAL RD  
SPRINGFIELD VA

2

22161

This is a U.S. Government publication. Its contents in no way represent the policies, views, or attitudes of the U.S. Government. Users of this publication may cite FBIS or JPRS provided they do so in a manner clearly identifying them as the secondary source.

Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) and Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS) publications contain political, military, economic, environmental, and sociological news, commentary, and other information, as well as scientific and technical data and reports. All information has been obtained from foreign radio and television broadcasts, news agency transmissions, newspapers, books, and periodicals. Items generally are processed from the first or best available sources. It should not be inferred that they have been disseminated only in the medium, in the language, or to the area indicated. Items from foreign language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed. Except for excluding certain diacritics, FBIS renders personal names and place-names in accordance with the romanization systems approved for U.S. Government publications by the U.S. Board of Geographic Names.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by FBIS/JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpts] in the first line of each item indicate how the information was processed from the original. Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear from the original source but have been supplied as appropriate to the context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by the source. Passages in boldface or italics are as published.

#### SUBSCRIPTION/PROCUREMENT INFORMATION

The FBIS DAILY REPORT contains current news and information and is published Monday through Friday in eight volumes: China, East Europe, Central Eurasia, East Asia, Near East & South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, and West Europe. Supplements to the DAILY REPORTs may also be available periodically and will be distributed to regular DAILY REPORT subscribers. JPRS publications, which include approximately 50 regional, worldwide, and topical reports, generally contain less time-sensitive information and are published periodically.

Current DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications are listed in *Government Reports Announcements* issued semimonthly by the National Technical Information Service (NTIS), 5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, Virginia 22161 and the *Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications* issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

The public may subscribe to either hardcover or microfiche versions of the DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications through NTIS at the above address or by calling (703) 487-4630. Subscription rates will be

provided by NTIS upon request. Subscriptions are available outside the United States from NTIS or appointed foreign dealers. New subscribers should expect a 30-day delay in receipt of the first issue.

U.S. Government offices may obtain subscriptions to the DAILY REPORTs or JPRS publications (hardcover or microfiche) at no charge through their sponsoring organizations. For additional information or assistance, call FBIS, (202) 338-6735, or write to P.O. Box 2604, Washington, D.C. 20013. Department of Defense consumers are required to submit requests through appropriate command validation channels to DIA, RTS-2C, Washington, D.C. 20301. (Telephone: (202) 373-3771, Autovon: 243-3771.)

Back issues or single copies of the DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications are not available. Both the DAILY REPORTs and the JPRS publications are on file for public reference at the Library of Congress and at many Federal Depository Libraries. Reference copies may also be seen at many public and university libraries throughout the United States.